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ABSTRACT
In the absence of effective international and federal initiatives to combat
the impacts of global climate change, many state, local and regiona l
jurisdictions are passing or proposing measures to curb carbon dioxide
(CO2) emissions. The province of British Columbia, Canada, as well as
the cities of San Francisco, California and Boulder, Colorado have carbon
taxes in place, and similar actions have been proposed in the Oregon and
Washington state legislatures. The state of California and the province of
Québec have linked together in a joint cap-and-trade system. This Article
will examine the fundaments of carbon taxation, including identification
of the tax base (the pollutant) and taxpayer (consumer, manufacturer, etc.),
rates of taxation, measurement standards for tax assessment, exemptions, and
use of revenue, and then compare them to cap-and-trade systems. It will
assess this family of market initiatives based on the following criteria: (1)
administerability, (2) political feasibility, (3) revenue generation, (4) efficiency,
(5) equity, and (6) efficacy. Lastly, the Article considers the constitutional,
practical, and political challenges to reform. The Article concludes that all
states and provinces in North America should link together in a strict cap-
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and-trade system while local jurisdictions within the region should pass
broad-based carbon taxes. Any revenue generated from these market
mechanisms can be recycled to low-income taxpayers and used for carbon
sequestration and other “green” purposes. Although the urgency for binding
law on a national and international scale is apparent but not immediately
forthcoming, regional, state and municipal initiatives can serve as blueprints
for innovative and effective climate policy change.
INTRODUCTION
Even though “no serious scientist” would disagree about the fact of
climate change,1 the countries of the world have been unable to successfully
address this pressing problem, particularly the world’s richest countries.2
Despite twenty United Nation summit meetings, no global initiative has
resulted in any hard-law agreements on greenhouse gas (GHG) reductions.3
On the U.S. federal level, Congress has passed no cap-and-trade or carbon
tax legislation.4 A few countries have been successful in their market-based
initiatives to combat global warming, but most have failed.5
In the Western North America many promising regional, state and local
initiatives have been passed or have been proposed.6 At the regional level,

1. See Dimitri Zenghelis, Book Review, Science Fact, Climate Fiction—Clarifying the
Debate, AM. SCIENTIST, May-June 2010, http://www.americanscientist.org/bookshelf/pub/
science-fact-climate-fiction-clarifying-the-debate.
2. See Alexander Jung et al., The Warming World: Is Capitalism Destroying Our
Planet?, DER SPIEGEL (Feb. 25, 2015 6:05 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/
climage-change-failed-efforts-to-combat-global-warming-a-1020406.html; see also Paul
Brown, World’s Richest Nationals ‘Failing’ to Address Climate Change, CLIMATE HOME
(Jan. 15, 2014, 8:34 AM), http://www.climatechangenews.com/2014/01/15/worlds-richestnations-failing-to-address-climate-change. Even Pope Francis has been discussing this
issue. See Daniel Henninger, Why Can’t the Left Govern, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2014, at
A15.
3. Justin Worland, What to Know About the Historic ‘Paris Agreement’ on Climate
Change, TIME (Dec. 12, 2015), http://time.com/4146764/paris-agreement-climate-cop-21/
(discussing the fact that emissions targets of individual countries are non-binding).
4. In the absence of mandates, the administration’s efforts have been limited to
updating EPA standards, climate-related research, and voluntary emission reduction programs
relating to GHG emissions. See discussion infra Part I.B. On March 28, 2014, President
Obama initiated regulations on methane, etc. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CLIMATE
ACTION PLAN—STRATEGY TO REDUCE METHANE EMISSIONS (Mar. 2014), https://www.white
house.gov/sites/default/files/strategy_to_reduce_methane_emissions_2014-03- 28_final.pdf.
5. See discussion infra Part I.C.
6. See discussion infra Part III.
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California and Québec have a cap-and-trade system in place7 and the British
Columbia carbon tax has been effective at reducing carbon emissions with
only minimal impact on the economy.8 At the state and local level, carbon
taxes exist in both Boulder and San Francisco and have been proposed in
Oregon and Washington. However, much more needs to be done to combat
climate change.9 In the absence of federal and international action, regional,
state and local market initiatives can serve as blueprints, giving other
governments the opportunity to learn from these successful local innovative
models.10
Local initiatives11 are important in at least three key respects. First, many
of the problems causing climate change stem from local problems.12 Thus,

7. See discussion infra Part III.A.3.
8. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.a.
9. I guess I would put myself into the “transformative” school of thought when it
comes to environmental taxation. I view that environmental harms are “regrettable consequences
of economic development that can be minimized by different attitudes and concerted
efforts at environmentally sensitive practices.” David G. Duff, Tax Policy and Global
Warming, 51 CAN. TAX J. 2063, 2070 (2003) (Duff contrasts this transformative view with
the economic and justice/morality views). According to this transformative view, the
“main purpose of environmental taxes is not to internalize costs or assign blame for
environmental harms, but to encourage environmental awareness and shared responsibility
for creating a better environmental future.” Id. In addition, I believe that our outlook
should be the “blueprint” model, as opposed to the “scramble model.” “Blueprint” is an
optimistic viewpoint, stressing that change can come from the bottom up by focusing on
local actions that can address environmental challenges. See MCKENZIE FUNK, WINDFALL:
THE BOOMING BUSINESS OF GLOBAL WARMING ch. 2 (Penguin Press ed., 2014). “Scramble” is
reactive, where events outpace actions and change only comes when nature forces it. Id.
Under the “scramble” viewpoint, policy makers pay little attention to the problems. Id.
10. This Article strictly focuses on energy, for local green building initiatives, see
Nancy E. Shurtz, Eco-Friendly Building from the Ground Up: Environmental Initiatives
and the Case of Portland, Oregon, 27 J. OF ENVTL. LAW & LITIG. 237, 237–62 (2012).
11. “Local” hereinafter means regional, state, and local.
12. Climate change will affect different places in different ways, so the specific tax
and other policies used to manage impacts must be tailored to respond to each locality’s
unique conditions. When local governments create climate change policies, they should
be evaluated within the context of their specific environments, on a case-by-case basis,
and should establish a mix of strategies that reflect local priorities and the specific
vulnerabilities of the community. For example, in areas such as California, which are not
prone to hurricanes, but are prone to drought and high-traffic congestion, innovative
transportation policies aimed at mitigating congestion, and GHGs creates by cars, as well
as policies to fortify and support road infrastructure, should be promoted. See Evan Mills,
Climate Change, Insurance and the Buildings Sector: Technological Synergisms Between
Adaptation and Mitigation, 31 BUILDING RES. & INFO. 257, 271 (2003). Alternatively, in
areas that are prone to frequent hurricanes or typhoons, land use policies that promote
redevelopment with green buildings, that are often more energy efficient and cost
effective to begin with, would contribute to a reduction in GHG’s and ultimately reduce
climate change. Id.
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it is within the local jurisdiction’s authority to plan and solve these problems.13
Second, changing the behavior of people and businesses is often more
effectively accomplished when done “from the bottom up,”14 and may have
a cumulative and thus a national (and international) impact.15 Third, in
the absence of effective federal and international initiatives, state and
local governments pursuing unique policies can serve as a petri dish for
the federal government and ultimately the international community by
offering innovative ideas that can translate into national and international
initiatives.16
13. Gawain Kripke & Brian Dunkiel, Taxing the Environment: Corporate Tax Breaks
to Promote Environmental Destruction, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR (Sept. 1998), http://www.
multinationalmonitor.org/mm1998/98sept/kripke.pdf; BEVERLY I. MORAN, ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT: TAXES, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY IN TAXING AMERICA
ch. 8 (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., N.Y. Univ. Press 1997). Moran
questions “why localities continue to provide incentives, given the tremendous economic
risks.” Id. at 198. Local initiatives referred to as “corporate welfare” or “perverse
incentives” are used by local governments to attract new business. The focus of these
incentives is to promote economic growth. However, the incentives are destructive to the
environment because they often provide no incentives for the new businesses to pursue
sustainable practices. To have an effective local climate change initiative, these local
policies must be eliminated or made contingent upon green initiatives. When local
governments offer large corporations income and property tax breaks to relocate within
the city or state, but make no restrictions on the corporation’s environmental activities,
such unsustainable policies cause a strain on local resources. Thus, local governments
must steer economic growth and urban development towards GHG reductions when they
offer corporate welfare packages to new businesses or completely curb this practice.
14. See Gawain Kripke & Brian Dunkiel, supra note 13; see also Beverly I. Moran,
supra note 13; see also Yair Listokin and David M. Schizer, I Like to Pay Taxes: Taxpayer
Support for Government Spending and the Efficiency of the Tax System, 66 TAX L. REV.
179 (2013). Since most people now live in urban areas and even more are expected to
move there in the future, changing behaviors in just a few city sectors, such as transportation,
land use, waste, and energy consumption, could make a considerable impact on climate
change.
15. Katherine A. Trisolini, All Hands on Deck: Local Governments and the Potential
for Bidirectional Climate Change Regulation, 62 STAN. L. REV. 669 (2010).
16. See Patricia M. DeChristopher, Flexibility, Efficiency, Integration: Local Lessons in
Sustainable Development, 16 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 157 (2005); Myanna M.
Dellinger, Localizing Climate Change Action, 14 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 603 (2013); Joe
Loper, Evaluating Existing State and Local Tax Codes from an ‘Environmental Tax’
Perspective: The Case of Energy-Related Taxes, 12 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 61 (1994); Robert B.
McKinstry, Jr., Laboratories for Local Solutions for Global Problems: State, Local, and
Private Leadership in Developing Strategies to Mitigate the Causes and Effects of Climate
Change, 12 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 15 (2004); Hari M. Osofsky & Janet Koven Levit,
The Scale of Networks: Local Climate Change Coalitions, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 409 (2008)
(“A growing scholarly and public policy dialogue examines . . . the role of localities in
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Tax initiatives in particular can provide a price signal that can direct
investment into new technologies or provide a motivation for people to
change their behavior.17 Thus, tax initiatives can have a triple-effect on
curbing climate change. First, tax deductions and credits in the income
tax system can incentivize good behavior.18 Second, environmental taxes
can punish bad behavior.19 Third, the revenue generated from environmental
taxes can be used to promote environmental practices that can combat
carbon emissions and climate change.20 New and innovative local tax policies,
in combination with other initiatives, such as cap-and-trade, should be
instituted that allow us to move forward in the fight against climate change.21
Part I of this Article examines International and U.S. federal climate
change initiatives, as well as those in several Scandinavian and European
countries. Part II of this Article compares carbon tax to cap-and-trade and
assesses these market initiatives based on economic, equitable, and other
criteria. Part III explores regional, state and local carbon reduction initiatives
in the Western North America and urges these types of initiatives be expanded
throughout the U.S. and Canada. Part IV makes some general assessments
and addresses the challenges to reform, such as constitutional, practical,
and political issues. Lastly, the Article concludes with a call for the federal
U.S. and international communities to take note of the innovative policies
that have been implemented in Western North America. A state/province
lead multilateral cap-and-trade program expanding throughout North
America combined with local carbon taxes would be the best way to approach

climate change regulation. To date, however, analyses of cities’ participation in climate
policy have largely focused on some combination of law and policy initiatives, urban
theory, and the intersection of international law with political science.”).
17. See Kenneth R. Richards, Framing Environmental Policy Instrument Choice,
10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 221, 225 (2000); see also Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global
Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 677–
800 (1999).
18. Janet E. Milne, Environmental Taxation in the United States: The Long View,
15 LEWIS & CLARK L.R. 424 (2011) [hereinafter Environmental Taxation in the United
States]; see also Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing
Governmental Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV.
L. REV. 705, 713–38 (1970) (Surrey is of the view that direct subsidies are as good as, if
not better than, tax subsidies); Charles D. Patterson, III, Environmental Taxes and
Subsidies: What is the Appropriate Fiscal Policy for Dealing with Modern Environmental
Problems? 24 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L & POL’Y REV. 121, 121–59 (2000).
19. Milne, Environmental Taxation in the United States, supra note 18.
20. See Stephen Sewalk, Carbon Tax with Reinvestment Trumps Cap-and-Trade,
30 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 580, 580–83 (2013); available at http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/
pelr/vol30/iss2/8; Marie Al Kirk & Christian L. Wade, A Taxing Problem for Environmental
Justice: The Tax Money From Hazardous Waste Facilities, Where It Goes, and What It
Means, 16 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 201 (1997).
21. See infra notes 289–91 and accompanying text.
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this problem.22 Such a plan might “nudge” the federal government into passing
needed legislation, but would at least give a message to the world that it
is possible to address the problems of climate change.23
I. INTERNATIONAL & U.S. FEDERAL CLIMATE CHANGE INITIATIVES
International and U.S. federal climate change initiatives have proven to
be inadequate at preventing climate change. UN Conventions and international
treaties have failed to stop global warming. The U.S. has also failed in its
passage of a carbon tax and cap-and-trade regime. Very few countries have
been successful at harnessing market initiative into effective global change
policy.
A. International Climate Change Initiatives Have Failed
At the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, the first major international agreement
on climate change—the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC)—was drafted.24 The UNFCCC states as its ultimate
objective is to achieve25
Stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.
Such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to
adapt naturally to climate change, ensure that food production is not threatened,
and enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.

UNFCCC sets forth a framework of guiding principles and includes general
commitments applicable to all parties. This framework was significant because

22. See WORLD BANK GROUP, States and Trends of Carbon Pricing 22 (May 13,
2014), http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/
05/27/00045628620140527095323/Rendered/PDF/882840AR0REPLA00EPI2102680Box
385232.pdf [hereinafter WORLD BANK] (stating market instruments can “co-exist in harmony
and complement each other effectively”).
23. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS. R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 5 (Yale University Press ed., 2008) (describing
“libertarian paternalism” as a way to try to influence people’s behavior in a direction that
will benefit them); see also Annabelle Jaeger, Five Reasons Why Local Government Should
Influence Climate Change Plans, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 6, 2015, 2:00 PM), http://www.the
guardian.com/public-leaders-network/2015/jan/06/local-government-climate-change-plans.
24. United Nations Framework Convention of Climate Change, INC/FCCC 5th
Sess., 2d Part, at Annex I, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (Part II) (May 9, 1992), https://unfccc.int/
resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf.
25. Id. at 4.
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it represented a solid collaborative commitment from all corners of the
globe to prevent GHG concentrations in the atmosphere.
Five years after the original Rio Earth Summit, the first international
protocol was passed in 1997, at Kyoto, Japan, and entered into force in
2005.26 The Protocol set forth national emission reduction targets for
developed nations to meet in two commitment periods between 20082012 and 2013-2020, as well as a flexible mechanism to meet them.27 By
2009, the Protocol had been adopted by 192 parties.28 However, the United
States, along with many other nations who signed the Protocol, refused to
ratify it.29 Canada signed and ratified the Treaty, but withdrew in 2011.30
In the second commitment period, only 12% of the world’s GHG emissions
were covered and only 9 countries had ratified the Treaty.31 Russia, Japan,
and New Zealand, three major carbon emitters, officially pulled out during
this second commitment period.32 Therefore, while the Kyoto Protocol
initially seemed like a significant step in the right direction, in recent years

26. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change 3 (1998), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf [hereinafter “Protocol”
or “Kyoto Protocol” or “Treaty”]. The Protocol set forth specific limitations on annual
GHG emissions. The limit could be satisfied by reducing GHG emissions, investing in
carbon “sinks” that remove GHG from the atmosphere, or by acquiring emission reduction
units from other parties. Id. at 3–9. See also United Nations Framework on Climate Change,
UN Climate Change Newsroom (1992), http://unfccc.int/index.html; see also United Nations
Framework on Climate Change, Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol (2014), http://
unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php.
27. The Protocol was amended in 2012 to accommodate the 2013-2020 commitment
period in what was known as the Doha Amendment of the Kyoto Protocol. However, as
of August 2015, the Doha Amendment was not yet in force. See International Institute for
Sustainable Development, August Update on Doha Amendment Ratification, Climate Change
Policy & Practice. (Aug. 18, 2015), http://climate-l.iisd.org/news/august-update-on-dohaamendment-ratification/; see also United nations Framework Convention of Climate Change,
Status of the Doha Amendment (Dec. 21, 2015), http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/doha_
amendment/items/7362.php (providing interactive map showing ratification of the Doha
Amendment establishing the Second Commitment Period of the KP.).
28. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Status of Ratification
of the Kyoto Protocol (2014), http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/
2613.php.
29. See Sewalk, Europe Should Dump Cap-and-Trade in Favor of Carbon Tax with
Reinvestment to Reduce Global Emissions, WASH. & LEE J. CLIMATE ENERGY & ENV’T
355, 364 n.51 (2014) [hereinafter Europe Should Dump Cap-and-Trade].
30. Trisolini, supra note 15, at 671; see also David G. Duff, Carbon Taxation in
British Columbia, 10 V T. J. ENVTL. L. 87, 88 (2008), http://vjel.vermontlaw.edu/files/
2013/06/Carbon_Taxation_in_British_Columbia.pdf (“GHG emissions in Canada increased
substantially throughout the 1990s and early 2000’s; reaching 747 million tons in 2005over 25% higher than 1990 level and almost 34% higher than Canada’s commitment under
the Kyoto Protocol”).
31. WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 14.
32. Id. at 16.
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it has been a disappointing failure. At best, it has resulted in non-binding,
soft targets from most participants.
The lack of binding participation on the international level became
apparent in 2007 at the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),
when the Panel released its Fourth Assessment Report.33 This report
indicated that global emissions would need to be reduced by 80-90% or
more by 2050.34 In the same year, the comprehensive Stern Review on the
Economics of Climate Change carried out by the U.K. Treasury concluded
that economic cost of delayed greenhouse gas reductions would be far
greater than previously projected.35 Yet, in 2009, at the UNFCCC’s 15th
Conference of the Parties (COP15) in Copenhagen, a binding agreement
had still not been created. The agreement that was created at COP15 in
2009, the “Copenhagen Accord,” provided a “soft” commitment to keep
the global temperature increase below two degrees and a scheme to protect
tropical rainforests known as Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and
Forest Degradation (REDD).36 While the COP18 in 2013 in Warsaw modified
REDD (REDD+)37 and focused on “urbanization, and specifically buildings
and transport, and on the role of local government to enhance global mitigation
efforts,”38 nothing binding was passed.39
Yet, despite these efforts, REDD+ has failed.40 In addition, the United
Nations Convention to Combat Desertification has failed.41 This convention’s
33. See Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report Summary for Policyma kers,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, (2014), http://ipcc.ch/pdf/assessmentreport/ar5/syr/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf.
34. Id.
35. NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW,
XV, 511 (Cambridge University Press ed., 2007).
36. Proposal by the President, Copenhagen Accord (Dec. 18, 2009), http://unfccc.
int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.pdf.
37. WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 37, 42.
38. Id. at 37. Although the past climate change initiatives have failed, the
Mediterranean Action Plan and Montreal Protocol on ozone depletion were a success. See
Paul G. Harris, Collective Action on Climate Change: The Logic of Regime Failure, 47
NAT. RESOURCES J. 195 (2007).
39. See Press Release, United Nations Climate Change Conference in Warsaw
Keeps Governments on a Track Towards 2015 Climate Agreement (Nov. 23, 2013),
http://unfccc.int/files/press/news_room/press_releases_and_advisories/application/pdf/13
1123_pr_closing_cop19.pdf.
40. Chris Lang, The Dismal Failure of the REDD+ Partnership, REDD MONITOR
(Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.redd-monitor.org/2014/11/20/the-dismal-failure-of-the-reddpartnership.
41. STEPHEN EMMOTT, TEN BILLION 188 (Vintage Books 2013).
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“emphasis on a bottom-up approach” to stop land degradation and
desertification “suggests that a different approach may lead to more
meaningful results.”42 Recent United Nations data “suggest that fifty
percent of drylands currently under agricultural cultivation are moderately
or severely degraded, and 12 million hectares of productive land become
barren each year due to desertification and drought.”43 Lastly, the Convention
on Biological Diversity has failed.44 With no compliance mechanism, this
Convention is very weak and thus fails to stop “monstrous projects.”45 If
global temperatures rise by more than 3.5°C “70% of the world’s known
species risk extinction.”46
The twenty-first Climate Change Conference in Paris in December 2015,
made some significant steps in our fight against climate change, but will
only become legally binding if fifty-five parties to the Agreement sign
on.47 Over 190 countries “pledged” to hold average global temperatures
to below 2 degrees Celsius (or 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit).48 The Agreement
calls on the countries to report their progress and revisit their targets every
five years.49 Unfortunately, nonbinding global climate change initiatives
have failed in the past and may not succeed in the future.50

42. Alon Tal & Jessica A. Cohen, Bringing “Top-Down” to “Bottom-Up”: A New
Role for Environmental Legislation in Combating Desertification, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 163, 215–17 (2007).
43. Selley Weton, Michela Biasutti & Michael B. Gerrard, Legal & Scientific Integrity
in Advancing a “Land Degradation Neutral World,” 40 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 39, 40 (2015).
44. EMMOTT, supra note 41, at 188.
45. Rachael Waxler Ruiz, The Convention on Biological Diversity: An Affectation
of Conservation Exposed by the Interoceanic Chinese-backed Nicaraguan Canal, 28 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 455, 479 (2015); see also Rachelle Adam, Missing the 2010 Biodiversity
Target: A Wake-up Call for the Convention on Biodiversity?, 21 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L.
& POL’Y 123 (2010).
46. Anup Shah, Loss of Biodiversity and Extinctions, GLOBAL ISSUES, http://www.
globalissues.org/article/171/loss-of-biodiversity-and-extinctions (last updated Jan. 19, 2014).
47. Adoption of the Paris Agreement, Proposal by the President (Dec. 11, 2015),
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf [hereinafter Paris Agreement].
48. WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 22 (stating an aspiration of “much needed
international partnerships”); see also 2015 Paris Climate Conference, FRANCE DIPLOMATIE,
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/climate/2015-paris-climateconference-cop21 (last visited Dec. 23, 2015).
49. Paris Agreement, supra note 47, at 4.
50. Harris, supra note 38, at 197. (“Despite the Kyoto Protocol entering into force
in February 2005, the climate regime has been a failure”); see also Press Release, General
Assembly, Failure to Constrain Climate Change Will Create ‘Climate Chaos’, SecretaryGeneral Says at High-Level General Assembly Event Aimed at Inspiring Ambitious Accord,
U.N. Press Release GA/11658 (June 29, 2015).
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B. U.S. Federal Climate Change Policies Have Failed
The U.S. federal government’s climate change policies have been largely
ineffective at reducing GHG emissions and preventing climate change. In
the absence of Congressional action mandating a cap-and-trade system or a
carbon tax, the federal government’s climate change policies have largely
revolved around new EPA rules and a limited number of tax policies.51 In
general, the U.S. federal climate change policies have mostly failed.
Creating an effective climate change policy at the federal level has
proven difficult for political reasons.52 During the 2008 presidential election,
president-elect Obama supported the use of a cap-and-trade system to cut
greenhouse gas emissions by 80% by 2050 made his intention known that
he wanted the U.S. to become a leader in climate change.53 The cap-andtrade system that President Obama supported was a federal environmental
policy that imposed a mandatory cap on omissions while providing flexible
compliance options.54 The program aimed to reward innovation, efficiency,
and early action without inhibiting economic growth.55 Once elected, President
Obama issued Executive Order 13514 on Oct. 5, 2009, requiring federal

51. Thomas M. Gremillion, Setting the Foundation: Climate Change Adaptation at
the Local Level, 41 ENVTL. L. 1221, n.189 (2011) (citing Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting
Governance to Climate Change: Managing Uncertainty Through a Learning Infrastructure,
59 EMORY L.J. 1, 26 (2009)); see also Robert L. Glicksman, Climate Change Adaptation:
A Collective Perspective on Federalism Considerations, 40 ENVTL. L. 1159, 1163 (2010)
(“Despite the critical need for the development of adaptive response to climate change, the
federal government has done little to stake out its turf on adaptation policy or to coordinate
the response of lower levels of government”); and see J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation
and the Structural Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363, 412 (2010)
(“The United States has compiled close to zero in the way of coordinated anticipatory
adaptation policy for managing the risk in the United States of climate change catastrophe
and crisis”).
52. Many prominent Republicans do not even believe in global warming or climate
change or do not believe it is an immediate threat. Ashley Parker, Day After Fed Uproar,
Perry Tones It Down, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/18/us/
politics/18perry.html.
53. Robert N. Stavins, Obama’s Speech on a U.S. Cap-and-Trade System and Global
Climate Negotiations, BELFER CENTER (Nov. 20, 2008), http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/
publication/18682/obamas_speech_on_a_us_capandtrade_system_and_global_climate_
negotiations.html.
54. Id.
55. Cap and Trade, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/captrade (last
visited Dec. 23, 2015).
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agencies to undertake various measures to reduce GHG emissions56 and
to identify climate change strategies in conjunction with the interagency
Climate Change Adaptation Task Force.57 As of the writing of this Article
however, most agencies have only made promises.58 Some have argued
that federal policy failed to encourage coordination with state and local
authorities while others even argued federal policy inhibited best practices
of local jurisdictions. 59 However, what is clear is that the policy got
bogged down in the political doldrums and was never successfully fully
implemented.
An equally exciting, but ultimately unsuccessful, attempt by a U.S. federal
agency to control climate change came from the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). NOAA had proposed a reorganization
to create a national Climate Service, centralizing federal sources of
information on climate change strategies.60 Congressional Republicans,
unfortunately, have targeted NOAA’s revenue-neutral reorganization in
recent spending bills and cut off funding to the Climate Service.61
With the current failure of the Republican Congress to pass climate
change legislation, the Obama administration’s efforts have been focused
on the EPA’s initiative to treat greenhouse gas emissions as pollution
under the Clean Air Act.62 The EPA recently set forth clean energy guidelines
(the Clean Power Plan or CPP) for fuel-fired electric plants.63 The CPP

56. Exec. Order No. 13514, 74 Fed. Reg. 52,117 (Oct. 5, 2009) (revoked by Exec.
Order No. 13693, 80 Fed. Reg. 15,871 (Mar. 19, 2015)). Pursuant to the Executive Order,
all federal agencies were required by June 2011 to issue an agency-wide climate change
adaptation policy statement, which commits the agency to adaptation planning to address
challenges posed by climate change risks to the agency’s mission, programs, and operations.
Id.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Strategic Sustainability Performance Plan, June 2014,
https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/2014-DOT-Strategic-SustainabilityPerformance-Plan.pdf.
59. Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance in Climate Change: Managing
Uncertainty Through a Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1, 26 (2009); Glicksman, supra
note 51, at 26; Ruhl, supra note 51, at 412.
60. Emily Yehle, Appropriations: House Votes to Slash Climate Research, Block
New Red Snapper Fishing Plan, E&E PUBLISHING, LLC, June 4, 2015, http://wwweenews.net/
stories/106001948; see also Examining NOAA’s Climate Service Proposal: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Sci., Space, & Tech., 112th Cong. 1–3 (2011) (statement of Dr. Jane Lubchenco,
Administrator, NOAA).
61. Press Release. H. Comm. on Sci., Space & Tech., Republicans Raise Concerns with
NOAA Climate Service, EPA Science Activities (Mar. 10, 2011), https://science.house.gov/
news/press-releases/republicans-raise-concerns-noaa-climate-service-epa-science-activities.
62. The Clean Air Act of 1963, 42 U.S.C. § 7401(d)(2014).
63. Clean Power Plan for Existing Power Plants, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www2.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/clean-power-plan-existing-power-plants#additionalresources (last visited Dec. 24, 2015).
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requires each state to submit an implementation plan for EPA approval by
June 16, 2016 and authorizes the states to use market-based programs to
meet emission targets.64 Issues surrounding whether the CPP is within the
scope of EPA authority has been tied up in litigation.65 The Supreme Court
is expected to hear the case in 2018 or 2019.66 Unfortunately, the regulatory
approach is often slow, complex and inefficient.
In the federal tax law area, environmental taxes and income tax incentives
have largely failed to combat climate change.67 Very few environmental
initiatives exist; and, the ones that do have a very small effect on climate
change.68 Environmental taxes are imposed on crude oil and petroleum
products (oil spill liability), the sale or use of ozone-depleting chemicals
(ODCs), imported products containing or manufactured with ODCs,69 and
gas guzzling cars.70 These taxes are antiquated, too narrowly tailored, and
as a result, are ineffective in combatting climate change.71 Tax incentives
have often subsidized bad environmental activities, such as oil and gas
exploration, with minimal benefits for renewable energy and conservation.72

64. See Craig Gannett, Implementing Section 111(D) of the Clean Air Act: The
Pathway to Regional Cap-and-Trade Programs?, ROCKY MOUNTAIN MIN. L. FOUND. 8–3
(Jan. 2015) (noting the allowance of “market-based trading programs”).
65. Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); Util. Air Regulatory Grp.
v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
66. Gannett, supra note 64, at 9–10 (“To make matters more complicated, the current
demographics of the Court suggest that the outcome of this case may turn on the 2016
Presidential election”).
67. Roberta F. Mann, Waiting to Exhale?: Global Warming and Tax Policy, 51 AM.
U. L. REV. 1135, 1135–1222 (2002).
68. See Janet E. Milne, Environmental Taxation in the United States: Retrospective and
Prospective, in GREEN TAXATION IN EAST ASIA 113 (Richard Cullen et al. eds., 2011).
69. Environmental Taxes, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/publications/
p510/ch03.html (last visited Dec. 24, 2015).
70. See Milne, supra note 68, at 122 (Milne explains that the Gas Guzzler Tax has
been largely ineffective because of the exception for non-passenger vehicles like SUVs
and the tax rates have not been increased since 1990); see also Gas Guzzler Tax, 26 U.S.C.
§ 4064 (2005); and see 40 C.F.R. § 600.306-86 (2011).
71. See Yoram Margalioth, Tax Policy Analysis of Climate Change, 64 TAX L. REV.
63, 63–98 (2010).
72.
Mona L. Hymel, The Population Crisis: The Stork, The Plow, and the IRS, 77
N.C. L. REV. 13, 18 (1998); see also Ajay Gupta, Does the Tax Code Favor Fossil Fuels?,
149 TAX NOTES 331 (2015) (“President Obama has annually called for eliminating a dozen
or so tax preferences supposedly subsidizing fossil fuel production. According to the
administration’s fiscal 2016 budget, retaining those items would cost an aggregate of $49.7
billion in forgone revenue over 10 years.” Gupta goes on to enumerate the following tax
provision the administration wants to eliminate or reduce: (1) Section 263(a) (expensing
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Some successes have been made in wind and solar energy. 73 However,
much more reform is needed. Federal tax policy should incentivize clean
and renewable energy, preserve and protect carbon sinks, promote efficient
and clean-fuel vehicles, subsidize energy-efficient buildings and appliances,
and reduce methane and other harmful GHG gas emissions. See summary
Chart I below for reform suggestions.
CHART I: ENVIRONMENTAL TAX INCENTIVES
Sector

Energy

74

The Bad

Coal-fired75
Oil-fired76
Nuclear77

The Good
Renewable:
Wind, solar,
hydroelectric,
geothermal
Energy
conservation
Increasing
efficiency
Reducing waste

Reform
Reduce or
eliminate the
current oil, gas
and coal
subsidies.
 Percentage
depletion;
 Intangible
drilling cost;
 Enhanced oil
recovery
credits;

of intangible drilling expenses); (2) Section 616(a) (expensing of development costs for
mine or other natural deposits other than oil or gas well); (3) Section 617(a) (deduction for
mining exploration costs); (4) Section 193 (qualified tertiary injectant expenses); (5)
Section 174 (expensing of research and development costs); (6) Section 613 and 613A
(percentage depletion); and (7) Section 199 (domestic manufacturing deduction for oil and
natural gas)); but see John A. Bogdanski, Reflections on the Environmental Impacts of
Federal Tax Subsidies for Oil, Gas, and Timber Production, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
323, 332–33 (2011).
73. RUSSELL H. PLANTE, SOLAR ENERGY PHOTOVOLTAICS AND DOMESTIC HOT
WATER 116 (1 ed. 2014); CRAIG M. KLINE, SOLAR IN THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY:
EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLES 391, 394 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2011); Eric Stoutenburg,
Combining Offshore Wind and Wave Farms to Facilitate Grid Integration of Variable
Renewables, STANFORD WOODS INST. FOR THE ENV’T (Apr. 23, 2012, 4:15-5:15 PM),
http://energyseminar.stanford.edu/node/429.
74. Richard Westin, What to Do With Proceeds of a Carbon Tax?, 115 TAX NOTES
191–93 (2007); Shi-Ling Hsu, Reducing Emissions From the Electricity Generation Industry:
Can We Finally Do It?, 14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 427 (2001).
75. Roberta Mann, Another Day Older and Deeper in Debt: How Tax Incentives
Encourage Burning Coal and the Consequences for Global Warming, 20 PAC. MCGEORGE
GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 111 (2007).
76. Mona L. Hymel, Environmental Tax Policy in the United States: A “Bit” of History,
3 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 157, 162 (2013).
77. Katarina Olivia Savino, The Case of Nuclear Power Incentives, 123 TAX NOTES
329, 331 (2009).
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Pass new
energy law
extending and
adding tax
incentives
 Extend and
modify the
renewable
energy
production
tax credit;
 Extend and
modify the
solar energy
and fuel-cell
investment
tax credit;
 Remove the
caps on
credits for
residential
solar property
and
residential
fuel-cell
property;
 Create a tax
credit for
plug-in hybrid
vehicles;
 Create a
credit for
cellulosic
alcohol
production;
 Extend the
credit for
biodiesel
production;

75
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Forestry78

Clear-cutting
Logging
Soil erosion
Nonsustainable
forest
practices

9/29/2016 10:31 AM

Preserve existing
forests
Increase carbon
sequestration by
planting new
forests
Increase wildlife
habitat and
biodiversity
Prevent soil
erosion

 Extend and
increase the
credit for
alternative
refueling
stations;
 Eliminate the
“SUV
loophole,”
which allows
business to
claim a tax
break for
buying lessefficient
heavy
vehicles; and
 Create
renewable
energy bonds
for public
power
providers and
electric
cooperative
Eliminating
below-cost
timber sales
and other
subsidies on
public lands
End preferential
timber-tax
treatment
 Capital gains
for timber
sales

78. See generally Janet E. Milne, Timber Taxes: A Critique of the Northern Forest Lands
Council’s Tax Recommendations, 19 VT. L. REV. 423 (1995); LARRY KREISER ET AL.,
ENVTL. TAXATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE: ACHIEVING ENVTL. SUSTAINABILITY THROUGH
FISCAL POLICY 150, 151 (Larry Kreiser et al. eds., 10th ed. 2011); Mann, supra note 67.
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Improve
watershed
management
Harvest forests
sustainably
Preserve spiritual
respite and
scenic beauty
for humans

 Expanding
timber
production
 Continue
incentives for
conservation
and
reforestation
 Allow tax
credits for
carbon
sequestration

Industry79

Low energy
efficiency
Non or low
recyclable
content

High energy
High recyclable
content80

Limit the
advertising
deduction81
Eliminate
policies
favoring debt
and
consumption
Impose
pollution tax
on SO2, NO,
noise, air and
water pollution

Agriculture82

Erosion of
wetlands
Nitrogen
fertilizer
High

Organic farming
Local production
Sustainable
farming

Eliminate or
reduce bad
tax incentives

79. Mona Hymel, The United States’ Experience With Energy-Based Tax Incentives:
The Evidence Supporting Tax Incentives for Renewable Energy, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 43,
53, 67 (2006).
80. Britt Anne Bernheim, Can We Cure Our Throwaway Habits by Imposing the True
Social Cost on Disposable Products?, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 953, 966 (1992).
81. Mona L. Hymel, Consumerism, Advertising, and the Role of Tax Policy, 20 VA.
TAX REV. 347, 349 (2000).
82. Hymel, The Population Crisis, supra note 72, at 76, 86.
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transportation
costs
Eutrophication

Transportation83

Fuel-inefficient
cars
Airplane travel
Parking

Fuel-efficient cars
Public
transportation
Walking/biking

Housing84

Urban sprawl
Erosion of

High-density
housing/multi-

 Capital
intensive
subsidies
 Capital gains
preferences
on sale of
cattle
 Cash method
for farmers
Impose tax on
fertilizer
Eliminate the
tax preferences
for commuting
 Tax the
parking
provided by
the employer
 Reduce
expensing of
light trucks
(SUVs)
 Eliminate
light truck
exception to
gas-guzzle
tax
Continue to
promote
hybrids and
electric cars,
carpooling,
and biking
Increase
gasoline tax
Limit mortgage
interest

83. See generally Roberta F. Mann, On the Road Again: How Tax Policy Drives
Transportation Choice, 24 VA. TAX REV. 587, 595 (2005).
84. Mark Andrew Snider, The Suburban Advantage: Are the Tax Benefits of Home
Ownership Defensible?, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 157, 158–87 (2005); Roberta F. Mann, The
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wetlands
Large new
and/or
inefficient
homes in
open areas
Inefficient
appliances

Population85

Over
population
Over
consumption

family
Renovated homes
Energy efficient
homes
High energy
efficient
appliances

Limit population
Limit
consumption

deduction on
low energyefficient homes
or on large
homes
Disallow
mortgage
deduction on
vacation
homes
Tax inefficient
appliances
Limit
dependency
exemption
Eliminate or
limit the perchild credit
Tax
consumption
(VAT or
National
sales tax)

Other86
Reduce
methane
and other
GHG
emissions

(Not So) Little House on the Prairie: The Hidden Costs of the Home Mortgage Interest
Deduction, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1347, 1347–97 (2000).
85. Hymel, supra note 72, at 48, 55.
86. See Duff, supra note 9, at 2107–09.
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The main reason for the environmental climate change conundrum in
America is political.87 Therefore, like the failed attempts to prevent
climate change on the international level, a large-scale solution to
climate change at the U.S. federal level is unlikely in the near future.88
Therefore, from a federal policymaking standpoint, the U.S. federal
government’s promises to reduce climate change have followed the
global climate change trend—with a bunch of hot air.
C. A Few Countries Have Had Successes But Most Have Failed
Some Scandinavian and European countries have passed effective carbon
taxes, usually in combination with other forms of energy and pollution
taxation and tax subsidies.89 In addition, many of these countries are also
part of the regional emissions trading system (the EU ETS), thus demonstrating
that a country can utilize both of these carbon pricing mechanisms.90 Some
countries, like Australia, have passed carbon taxes and then repealed them.91
Other countries have proposed carbon taxes, but never passed them.92
Most countries of the world, however, have never even contemplated a
carbon tax.93

87. A majority of the population thinks the economy, not the environment, is the
most important problem the country faces today. See Most Important Problem, GALLUP,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/1675/most-important-problem.aspx (last visited Dec. 26, 2015).
88. See Roberta F. Mann, The Case for the Carbon Tax: How to Overcome Politics
and Find Our Green Destiny, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10118, 10119 (2009)
(stating that “it appears inevitable that Congress will enact some sort of federal climate
change legislation in the next few years”).
89. CARBON TAX CTR., Where Carbon is Taxed, http://www.carbontax.org/ progress/
where-carbon-is-taxed (last updated Apr. 6, 2016); see also Duff, Tax Policy and Global
Warming, supra note 9, at 2092, 2094 (mentioning how Scandinavian countries use a
combination of tax and subsidy approaches and pointing out the fertilizer tax in Sweden).
Denmark also has a sulfur tax. See infra note 112.
90. Denmark, Finland, France, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands
Portugal, Sweden, and the UK are part of the EU. See EU Member Countries, EUROPEAN
UNION, http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/member-countries/index_en.htm (last visited
Dec. 26, 2015).
91. For countries that have enacted a carbon tax, see CARBON TAX CTR., supra note
89.
92. For countries that have proposed a carbon tax, see CARBON TAX CTR., supra
note 89.
93. See EUROPEAN ENV’T AGENCY, Progress Towards 2008–2012 Kyoto Target in
Europe (2014), http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/progress-towards-2008-2012-kyoto#
tab-news-and-articles.
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1. The Scandinavian Success Stories
The Scandinavian countries of Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Norway
have been the pioneers in carbon taxation. Perhaps the most successful
country has been Sweden, followed by Denmark and Finland. In contrast,
Norway’s carbon tax has been largely ineffective at reducing GHG emissions.
The lessons learned here are that the effectiveness of the carbon tax depends
on a number of factors, such as the scope of the tax, its rate, exemptions,
and where the revenue from the tax goes.
The Swedish carbon tax, passed in 1991, has the highest rate of all
countries in the world.94 Like most successful carbon tax initiatives the
initial rates were to increase over time.95 As of 2014, the rate was equivalent
to US $168/tCO2.96 The tax is broad based in its scope, covering all fossil
fuels used for heating and all motor fuels for transport—about 25% of the
GHG emissions in the country.97 To enhance business competitiveness
and support economic efficiency, the tax is higher on households and the
service sector98and lower in sectors subject to international competition.99
The tax is compatible with EU ETS as fossil fuels regulated there are fully
exempt and even non-ETS industry and agriculture are partially exempt.100
Instead of directly providing exemptions to all GHG emissions covered
under the EU Cap-and-Trade system, exemptions gradually increased over
time.101 Administrative costs have been low, less than 0.1% of the revenue
collected,102 and revenue from the tax has been steady from 1993 to 2000
94. WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 17 (stating that the rates range from the high in
Sweden to the low in Mexico of US $1/tCO2e).
95. Jacqueline Cottrell, Green Budget Economy, United Nations Environment
Programme on Carbon Taxes: Fiscal Policies Towards an Inclusive Green Economy (Oct.
8, 2012), Exhibit 3, http://www.unep.org/greeneconomy/Portals/88/documents/research_
products/Fiscal%20Policies/2_Cottrell_CarbonTax_IMF_UNEP_GIZ_2012_FINAL.pdf.
96. WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 17.
97. WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 82.
98. Cottrell, supra note 95, at 3 (stating that levels of taxation increased from €27
in 1991 to €114 in 2011); Mikael Skou Andersen, Europe’s Experience with CarbonEnergy Taxation, 3 S.A.P.I.EN.S 6–7 (2010), http://sapiens.revues.org/1072#text (The
“large increase in household electricity taxes depressed real incomes in the short run”).
99. Cottrell, supra note 95, at 3 (showing low levels at €7 in 1991 and €34 outside
EU, zero within EU ETS, 2011); see also WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 82.
100. WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 82.
101. WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 82. (For example, “District heating plants
participating in the EU ETS and heat from EU ETS plants are not used for manufacturing
purposes now have to pay 80% of the tax rate compared to 94% before 2014.”)
102. Cottrell, supra note 95, at 3.
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and then increased to $3.65 billion annually in 2005-2007.103 Sweden directs
the revenues to the general budget.104 In other words, Sweden has mainly
recycled the revenues to lower income taxes, specifically the tax on labor.105
Swedish studies have indicated that GHG emissions fell about 15% between
1995 and 1990 and have fallen by more than 40% since the mid-1970s.106
At the same time, between 1990 and 2007, the Swedish economy has grown
over 20%.107 Interestingly, all political parties were willing to implement
this tax.108 A key ingredient of a successful tax is political leadership and
population acceptance.
Denmark is “one of the carbon tax proponents’ favorite case studies.”109
Passed in 1991, the carbon tax “was part of a larger environmental tax
package, which included energy taxes,” a sulfur tax, and subsidies for
wind and energy efficiency. 110 The tax was broad-based covering all
consumption of fossil fuels (oil, natural gas, coal and electricity) and thus
approximately 45% of the total GHG emissions in the country.111 Designed
to minimally impact industry, the rates varied depending on energy use
and phased-in over time.112 Tax rates increased each year between 2008
and 2015 and now stand at US $31/tCO2 equivalence.113 Like Sweden,
industries subject to the EU ETS are generally exempt, however fuels for
the production of district heating are subject to the tax even though covered
103. Jenny Summer et al., Carbon Taxes: A Review of Experience and Policy Design
Considerations, Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab, NREL/TP-6A2-47312, at 11 (2009), http://www.
nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/47312.pdf.
104. Id.
105. Andersen, supra note 98, at sec. 2.2 (“It would have been difficult for [Sweden
and Finland] to follow the recommendations from the fiscal literature to aim reductions at
employers’ social security contributions, because such contributions are relatively small
in both countries”).
106. Summer et al., supra note 103, at 12; see also Sierra Rayne, The Devil and the
Details of National Carbon Tax Experiments, AMERICAN THINKER (Feb. 21, 2015),
http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2015/02/the_devil_and_the_details_of_national_c
arbon_tax_experiments.html (“From 1991 to 3003, emissions declined just 0.9 percent.
Since 2003, emissions have declined 19 percent and there has been only 19 percent real
economic growth during this decade. . .”).
107. Summer et al., supra note 103, at 12; but see Cottrell, supra note 95, at Exhibit
4 (stating that GDP has gone from $100 billion to $143 billion). However, the consumer
price index has also increased. See Andersen, supra note 98, at sec. 2.3 (“The Swedish
experience suggests that combining carbon-energy taxes on households with reductions in
income taxes could cause inflation rates at a level triggering a possible tax interaction
effect, but further analysis is required to corroborate this”).
108. Cottrell, supra note 95, at 3.
109. Rayne, supra note 106.
110. WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 84–85; see also Rayne, supra note 106.
111. WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 79.
112. Id. (demonstrating how when the carbon tax passed, the tax on energy was reduced
to maintain an overall even tax rate).
113. Id.
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in the cap-and-trade.114 Energy-intensive sectors not in the cap-and-trade are
given exemptions similar to free allowance in the EU ETS,115 and up until
2014, these sectors could negotiate voluntary agreements to be exempt
if covered under the EU ETS.116 In 2008, the revenue from the Danish carbon
tax was $905 million.117 40% of that revenue is used for environmental
subsidies while the other 60% is returned to industry.118 Studies showed
that Denmark’s industrial emissions “decreased by 23% during the 1990s,
after adjusting for growth and market-induced industry restructuring.”119
However, unlike Sweden, the Danish economy has “contracted in real
terms by 3 percent since 2006.”120
Finland was the first country to adopt a carbon tax in 1990.121 This tax
was broad-based and imposed on gasoline, diesel, light fuel and heavy
fuel oil, jet fuel, aviation gasoline, coal natural gas and electricity.122 The
tax covers all consumers of fossil fuels, except for fuels for electricity
production, commercial aviation and commercial yachting.123 Its scope
was limited to covering only 15% of the total GHG emissions in the
country.124 Like Sweden and Finland, the rates varied on type of fuel and
gradually increased over time.125 In 2013, the liquid traffic fuel rate was
US $83/tCO2, whereas the rate for heating fuels increased to US $48 from
$41.126 Like Sweden, all revenues from the tax went directly to the general
budget without any earmarking. By lowering income taxes on labor, the
impact on lower-income taxpayers was made more equitable.127 In 2000,
114. Id.
115. Id. (“From 2013 incineration plants are included in the EU ETS and thus also
doubly regulated.”)
116. Id.
117. Cindy Bae, Denmark’s Carbon Tax Policy, THE UNIV. OF BRITISH COLUMBIA BLOG
(Feb. 7, 2013), http://blogs.ubc.ca/cindybae/2013/02/07/denmarks-carbon-tax-policy.
118. Summer et al., supra note 103, at 13.
119. Cf. Rayne, supra note 106, at 1 (“[B]etween 1992 and 2006, there was absolutely
no reduction in Denmark’s carbon dioxide emissions—actually, there was a slight increase.
Since 2006, there has been a large decrease in emissions (by about one-third)”).
120. Id.
121. Summer et al., supra note 103, at 9.
122. Id. (“Coal is subject to a tax of $73.97 per metric ton, natural gas is subject to a
reduced tax rate of $3.02 per MWh, and liquid fuels are taxed between $-.07 and $0.09
per liter.” (citing European Environmental Agency).
123. WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 79.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Andersen, supra note 98, at 6.
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the Finnish government determined that the tax resulted in a reduction of
roughly 4 million metric tons of CO2 (or 7% of emissions) between 1990
and 1998.128 Between 2007 and 2012 emissions declined 23 percent.129 On
the other hand, unlike Sweden, the Finnish national economy “shrunk
almost 4 percent in real terms.”130
Like Sweden and Denmark, Norway passed a carbon tax in 1991.131
The taxed sectors include gasoline, light and heavy fuel oil, and oil and
gas in the North Sea. Certain industries pay a reduced rate (pulp and paper,
fishmeal, domestic aviation, domestic shipping and continental shelf fleet)
while some industries (foreign shipping, fishing, and external aviation)
are exempt.132 Industry “included in the EU ETS are (partially) exempted
from the carbon tax, except for the offshore petroleum industry.133 The tax
covered 50% of the GHG emissions in the country.134 Like its sister states
of Finland and Sweden, revenue from the tax goes into the general
government budget.135 However, the funds were to be used to finance a
special pension fund. 136 Unfortunately, studies have shown that GHG
emissions have increased by 15% from the time the tax was first
implemented.137 Thus, the Norway carbon tax has mostly failed.

128. Summer et al., supra note 103, at 9.
129. Rayne, supra note 106.
130. Id.
131. WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 10, 81.
132. Id. at 10.
133. Id. at 80.
134. Id. at 81.
135. Summer et al., supra note 103, at 10.
136. Id.
137. Id. Norway also experienced an increase in GDP of 70% since 1990 and that is
the excuse used to explain the failure of the carbon tax. See Sumner et. al., supra note 103,
at 10.
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2. Other Countries Carbon Taxes
Several European countries have also passed carbon taxes: France,138
Iceland,139 Ireland,140 Italy,141 Netherlands,142 Portugal,143 Switzerland,144
and the United Kingdom.145 (See Appendix A) Under these systems, price
signals vary, ranging from low tax rates of $10t/CO2 in Iceland to $68t/
CO2 in Switzerland. The taxes are generally broad-based. UK’s tax covers
approximately 25% of GHF emissions,146 whereas Iceland’s covers 50%.147
Exemptions, or partial exemptions, are given for firms included in the EU
ETS. The use and amount of the revenue collected from the tax have also
varied. In the United Kingdom the tax was intended to be revenue neutral
with offsetting cuts to the National Insurance Contributions, but ended up
being revenue negative.148 In contrast, the Netherlands tax revenues were

138. See generally Dominique Bureau, The Political Economy of the 2009 French
Carbon Tax Project, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
(2012), http://www.oecd.org/env/tools-evaluation/The%20Political%20Economy%20of%20
the%202009%20French%20Carbon%20Tax%20project.pdf.
139. WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 10.
140. See id. at 80. In 2010, Ireland passed a carbon tax on emissions from fossil fuels,
including kerosene, diesel fuel, liquid petroleum, fuel oil and natural gas. See JENNY H.
LIU & JEFF RENFRO, CARBON TAX AND SHIFT: HOW TO MAKE IT WORK FOR OREGON’S
ECONOMY 9 (2013), http://www.pdx.edu/nerc/carbontax2013.pdf. In 2013, the tax was
expanded to solid fuels such as peat and coal. Id. The tax only applies to sectors not part
of the EU ETS. Id. The tax slowly phased in at higher amounts. Id. The tax is estimated to
generate 500 million pounds of revenue in 2013 and potentially offset the Irish income
tax. Id. Ireland’s Environmental Protection Agency estimates that overall GHG emissions
dropped 6.7% and energy GHG emissions dropped by 10.5%. Id. This was all done with
slight growth in the Irish economy. Id.
141. See Svetlana Kovalyova, Italy to Introduce Carbon Tax to Fund Green Energy,
REUTERS, Apr. 17, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/17/italy-carbontax-idUSL6
E8FHALR20120417.
142. WORLD BANK, supra note 22.
143. See Putting a Price on Carbon with a Tax, WORLD BANK 1, 3 [hereinafter WORLD
BANK 2], http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbak/document/Climate/backgroundnotex_carbon-tax.pdf.
144. WORLD BANK, supra note 22.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 83.
147. Id. at 80.
148. The United Kingdom passed a limited carbon tax in 2001. Summer et al., supra
note 103, at 13, 14. The tax covered electricity, natural gas supplied by gas utilities,
liquefied gas supplied in a liquid state for heating, and solid fuel, such as coal and coke,
lignite. Id. at 13. The sectors covered include industrial, commercial, agricultural, public
and service sectors and the rates vary depending on the sector. Id. Residential sectors were
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substantial—over $4.819 billion and the revenues are used to shift the tax
burden off individuals and business as well as recycle a portion for the
purchase of environmental equipment.149 More often the revenue goes
into the general fund and is used to shift taxes off individuals and businesses.
As far as effectiveness, the taxes vary, as does the impact on the country’s
economy.150 (See Chart 4 in Appendix B).
Only a few countries outside Europe have passed carbon taxes. For
example, South Africa and Kazakhstan have a carbon tax.151 The countries
in South America are just starting to implement carbon taxes.152 Both
Chile and Brazil have proposed a carbon tax.153 Australia passed a carbon
tax in 2012 and then repealed it in 2014.154 African countries and Middle
Eastern countries including Russia have not enacted any such taxes.155
Asian countries have generally preferred cap-and-trade, although the Republic
of Korea has a carbon tax.156 (See Appendix A)
3. The EU ETS Has Failed
In 2005, the EU implemented the EU Emissions Trading System (EU
ETS) encompassing 27 countries.157 The EU ETS program covered the electric
power sector and the major energy-intensive industrial sector.158 Many of
excluded. Id. A study estimated that the tax would reduce energy demand my 15%. Id. at
14.
149. Id. at 9. The Netherlands passed a carbon tax in 1990. Id. at 1. The tax is broadbased, covering natural gas, electricity, blast furnaces, coke ovens, refinery and coal gas,
coal gasification gas, gasoline, diesel, and light fuel. Id. at 9. The Netherlands Ministry of
Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment estimated that the tax would be effective
in reducing annual emissions by 5%. Id.
150. Rayne, supra note 106, at 1, 2.
151. WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 83.
152. Costa Rica passed a carbon tax in 1997, but has provided no data since 2005.
See Rayne, supra note 106, at 1.
153. WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 84.
154. The price was $23 per ton of carbon emissions and this was “extraordinarily
high by international standards and [it] lacked the phased-in approach of other programs
such as the EU ETS or the British Columbia carbon tax.” Michael Wara, Instrument
Choice, Carbon Emissions, and Information, 4 M ICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 261, 299
(2015). When the conservative party won the election, the tax was repealed. Id. Since it
was enacted by a simple majority of the parliament, repeal was easy with the election
changes. Id. This did not operate as a fixed price tax, it “was not actually a carbon tax.”
Id.
155. WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 78, 83.
156. Id. at 62–68, 84.
157. Id. at 70; Rachel Cleetus, We Need a Well-Designed Cap-and-Trade Program
to Fight Global Warming, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Jan. 2009), http://www.
ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/global_warming/capandtradeback
grounder.pdf.
158. Cleetus, supra note 157.
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the Scandinavian and European countries discussed above are part of the
EU, so in addition to their state carbon taxes, their carbon emitters are subject
to a cap-and-trade regime.159 Usually these industries are exempt or partially
exempt from the carbon tax, which could present an issue of effectiveness
because the EU ETS had been ineffective.160
The EU ETS has been criticized on several grounds. First, the cap was
set at a too high level and thus was too generous for polluters. In fact, no
reduction of emissions occurred because the price of allowances collapsed.161
Second, the allowances were not auctioned but grandfathered to existing
industries.162 The EU ETS ended up distributing 95% of the allowances
for free.163 Thus, the EU failed to meet its goals under the Kyoto Protocol.164
Several other jurisdictions outside the EU have passed cap-and-trade
systems. Switzerland, New Zealand, Japan, and Kazakhstan have a capand-trade, as does Alberta and Québec in Canada.165 The U.S. has the
California (CA) Cap-and-Trade and the Northeastern Regional one.166 A
growing number of countries are considering cap-and-trade, more so than
carbon taxes.167 When added to carbon taxes, about “40 countries and over
159. For a list of the European Union member countries, see Member countries of
the EU, EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index_en.htm (last visited
Dec. 29, 2015).
160. For Sweden, see supra notes 104–08 and accompanying text; for Denmark, see
supra notes 109–20 and accompanying text, for Norway, see supra note 131–37 and
accompanying text.
161. See Sewalk, Europe Should Dump Cap-and-Trade, supra note 29, at 374 (“Phase I
of the EU-ETS implementation saw another issue with an over-allocation of allowances
causing the price of those allowances to fall again…. During Phase II, the price for
allowances plummeted further, diminishing the incentive polluters had to reduce their
GHG emissions.”).
162. Andrew J. O’Connell, A Critical Analysis of Allowance Allocation in Cap-andTrade and Its Effect on Linked Carbon Markets, 44 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 339, 360–61 (2014).
In the first two periods allowances were grandfathered but in the later period they were
auctioned and benchmarked. Id.
163. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global Climate Change:
Why a Carbon Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming than Cap and Trade, 28 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 3, 41 (2009).
164. Id. at 42; see also EUROPEAN ENVTL. AGENCY, TECHNICAL REP., supra note 93.
165. Duff, supra note 9, at 90.
166. See discussion infra Part III.A.
167. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 5; see Ann E. Carlson, Designing
Effective Climate Policy: Cap-and-Trade and Complementary Policies, 49 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 207, 207 (2012) (stating that the cap-and-trade system is “the dominant policy choice”
to date); cf. Haifeng Deng, Improving the Legal Implementation Mechanisms for A Carbon
Tax in China, 32 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 665, 684 (2015) (stating that carbon trading is a
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20 sub-national jurisdictions are putting a price on carbon” and together
these carbon pricing instruments cover around “12% of the annual global
GHG emissions.”168 Of course, this is not enough and more needs to be
done.169
II. CARBON TAXES VS. CAP-AND-TRADE
A heated battle currently is being fought as to whether a cap-and-trade
or a carbon tax will be better to solve our climate change problem. Many
commentators and authors of law reviews have advocated that a cap-andtrade is better,170 whereas many others have argued that a carbon tax is
best.171 My thesis is that both carbon taxes and cap-and-trade should be
used on the local and regional level, particularly for Canada and the U.S.,
two of the largest contributors to climate change and two of the biggest
beneficiaries of climate change. 172 If designed properly, these market
mechanisms can work together and be effective.173
A. A Heated Debate
Most economists prefer carbon taxes. According to most economists,
price instruments, such as carbon taxes, can be expected to be more efficient
and effective than quantity instruments, such as tradable allowances.174
more natural regulation of the market economy than a carbon tax); available at http://
digital commons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss3/2.
168. WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 14.
169. Sewalk, Carbon Tax with Reinvestment Trumps Cap-and-Trade, supra note 20,
at 580–82, 609.
170. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 6–7; Carlson, supra note 167, at 208
n.8; Alex Rice Kerr, Why We Need a Carbon Tax, 34 ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 69, 92, 97
(2010); Mann, The Case for the Carbon Tax, supra note 88; Joshua Meltzer, A Carbon
Tax As a Driver of Green Technology Innovation and the Implications for International
Trade, 35 ENERGY L.J. 45, 67 (2014); Sewalk, Carbon Tax with Reinvestment Trumps
Cap-and-Trade, supra note 20, at 602–09; Wara, supra note 154, at 284.
171. See LARRY KREISER ET AL., supra note 78, at 41–42; see also David P. Warren
& Scott Tomashefsky, The Western Climate Initiative, 41 STATE & LOCAL GOV’T REV. 55
(2009), available at http://slg.sagepub.com/content/41/1/55.full.pdf+html; see also Melinda
Harm Benson, Regional Initiatives: Scaling the Climate Response and Responding to
Conceptions of Scale, 100 ANNALS OF THE ASS’N OF AM. GEOGRAPHERS 1025, 1025–35
(2010).
172. See discussion infra Part II.B. But see Carlson, supra note 167, at 226–47, for
a discussion of complementary policies as unnecessary in conjunction with a cap-andtrade program absent market failure.
173. See infra Part IV.
174. For example, former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers, Nobel laureate Joseph
Stiglitz, and Republican economist N. Gregory Mankiw all are in favor of a carbon tax.
Deborah Solomon, Climate Change’s Great Divide, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 17, 2007, 12:01
AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB118955082446224332. David Driesen notes that
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Economists favor taxes because “they provide the clearest price signal,
unencumbered by factors like baselines, allowance allocation, and use of
credits.”175 Price instruments are thought to perform better under uncertainty,
to raise valuable revenues and to avoid transaction costs.176 Economists
say a viable market for tradable pollution rights can rarely exist unless the
government makes the right decision and clears all market barriers to free
trade.177 Furthermore, tradable allowances may lead to environmental hot
spots in low-income communities and diminish the pressure on emitting
companies to make technological changes to restrict GHG emissions.178
On the other hand, most environmentalist and politicians favor cap-andtrade.179 Environmentalists want a certain cap on emissions to assure
environmental benefits. 180 Politicians hate taxes and have even signed

cap-and-trade can stifle innovation and result in concentrated local pollution. Parisa Smith,
Can the Success of Carbon Emission Cap-and-Trade Market be Predicted Based on the
EPA’s Acid Rain Program, 6 APPALACHIAN NAT. RESOURCES L.J. 57, 70 (2011-2012)
(construing David Driesen, Linkage and Multilevel Governance, 19 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 389, 409 (2009)).
175. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 34 n.120 (quoting N. Gregory Mankiw,
One Answer to Global Warming: A New Tax, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2007), http://www. nytimes.
com/2007/09/16/business/16view.html?_r=0).
176. Id. at 40–43.
177. Richard Posner, Should There be a Carbon Emissions Tax? BECKNER-POSNER
BLOG (July 7, 2013), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2013/07/should-there-be-a-carbonemissions-tax-posner.html.
178. Industry groups can essentially lobby to continue to pollute. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann,
supra note 163, at 44. The cap-and-trade framework sends an “ambiguous message”
that government allows you to pollute as long as you pay, essentially signaling that “it a
purchase price for a right to pollute”, in contrast to “a carbon [tax that] sends a clear
signal.” Id.
179. John Dingell, Democrat from Michigan and powerful chair of the Energy and
Commerce Committee, is one of the few politicians that favors carbon taxes. Kimberley
Strassel, Some Inconvenient Truths, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 6, 2007, 11:59 PM), http://www.wsj.
com/articles/SB119162838307050834 (stating it is “easy . . . to rig a [Cap-and-Trade] system.
Europe has shown that this is hell to make work. They’re going back to the drawing board
again, with no assurance they won’t make the same mistakes they did before.”).
180. See generally Yale Sch. of Forestry & Envtl. Stud., Putting a Price on Carbon:
An Emissions Cap or a Tax?, YALE ENV’T 360 (May 7, 2009), http://e360.yale.edu/feature/
putting_a_price_on_carbon_an_emissions_cap_or_a_tax/2148 (“From an environmental
point of view, the advantage of an emissions cap over a carbon tax is clear: A cap puts a
legal limit on pollution.”).
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pledges not to raise them.181 Furthermore, cap-and-trade systems allow
politicians to allocate original allowances to favored constituents.182
Business groups can go either way. Businesses usually like a certain
price so they can accurately determine their profit and calculate whether
they can pass on the increased cost to their consumers.183 Cost certainty
“enables business to plan ahead, secure in the knowledge that raising the
tax rate beyond any automatic adjustment, which can be planned for,
requires another vote” in the legislature.184 Nonpolluting companies might
support a carbon tax if they do not pollute and the revenues from the tax
will reduce their corporate tax.185 Of course, if the exiting industry can be
grandfathered into the cap-and-trade without paying for the initial allowance,
they would favor the cap-and-trade.186 In addition, business groups that
can sharply reduce their emissions will prefer cap-and-trade as they can
profit from selling their excess allowances to others.187 Lastly, Wall Street
would also most likely support cap-and-trade as “hefty fees” can be charged
“for arranging trades in allowances and futures trading.”188
B. A Comparison
Both the carbon tax and the cap-and-trade are market-based mechanisms
so both can encourage cost-effective technological innovation.189 Both can be
superior to the regulatory approach, which specifically mandates emissions,

181. Most politicians like cap-and-trade because it is a hidden tax but is not called a
tax. See Strassel, supra note 179. Most Republicans have signed onto the Norquist Pledge.
See Paul Waldman, Nearly All the GOP Candidates Bow Down to Grover Norquist, WASH.
P OST (Aug. 13, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2015/08/13/
nearly-all-the-gop-candidates-bow-down-to-grover-norquist.
182. See Yale Sch. of Forestry & Envtl. Stud., supra note 180 (comment by Roger
A. Pielke, Jr. stating that a cap-and-trade is doomed to failure).
183. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 46; see also Mann, The Case for the
Carbon Tax, supra note 88, at 10122, 10125.
184. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 42.
185. See Wara, supra note 154, at 297 (explaining that Walmart may support high
carbon tax if carbon tax will reduce its corporate income tax: “Wal-Mart, once it has
received the benefit of a reduction in tax liability, will be loath to return to a higher rate so
that American Electric Power can face a lower carbon tax liability.”); see also AviYonah
& Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 46.
186.
See Mann, supra note 88, at 10120–21. (“[F]ree allowances ease the transition
for exiting emitters, but could raise the cost of reducing carbon emissions. They also have
the anomalous result of rewarding exiting emitters with valuable allowances. This allocation
forms the main ‘winner-picking’ mechanism in cap-and trade.”).
187. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 46.
188. Id.; see also Wara, supra note 154, at 289.
189. See Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29
CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 95 (2001).
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tends to be complicated, and is slow to be fully implemented.190 In addition,
these mechanisms can be better than tax incentives for renewable energy
as they “incentivize efficiency improvements, reduction in energy use, and
fuel switching from higher-to-lower emissions fuels.”191 Since greenhouse gas
emissions occur throughout the world, a market-based instrument, such as
cap-and-trade, when linked with other countries, could prove the best
approach to solve the climate change problem.192 Nevertheless, both of these
market mechanisms can work together and be administered, politically
feasible, revenue generating, efficient, equitable, and effective.
1. Administerability
Whether a carbon tax or cap-and-trade system is adopted at the regional
or national level, the administerability issues are similar. Thus, both can
be effectively designed with a broad base, a low cap/or high tax, and few
exemptions. Both carbon taxes and cap-and-trade schemes can be imposed
“upstream” or “downstream.” Upstream measures usually hit emissions
from fossil fuel production (oil, coal and natural gas), such as refineries and
power plants.193 Such a system could be effective because it would ensure
that all sources of carbon dioxide at the point entering the economy are
covered and would impact fewer entities than downstream. 194 The
upstream approach also reduces complexity because it covers large sources.
Downstream would work better locally as it hits consumption, such as
motor vehicle drivers, electricity users, and arguably all sectors of the
economy emitting heat.195 However, this might impact political feasibility
as it more directly affects the consumer.196 In addition, the broader range
190. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 28–29 (explaining the “inherent
complexity of the Clean Air Act and the delays that would face any regulatory system to
reduce carbon dioxide emissions. Indeed, if past experience under the Clean Air Act is any
guide, litigation would ensue once a new regulatory regime was established leading to
even greater delays in carbon dioxide reductions.”).
191. Claudia O’Brien et al., Implementing Carbon Taxes: Considerations, Realities,
and Lessons Learned, ENERGY & CLIMATE REP., May 6, 2013, at 6.
These mandates and market initiatives often beat out voluntary agreements, all of these
mechanisms have a place. See generally Stewart, supra note 189.
192. See Wiener, supra note 17, at 692.
193. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 31.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See Janet E. Milne, Carbon Taxes in the United States: The Context for the Future,
10 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 13–14 (2008) [hereinafter Milne, Carbon Taxes in the United States].
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of sources could make administration more complex, because of the necessity
to increase the monitoring.
In general, a cap-and-trade tends to be more administratively complex.197
First, a baseline must be set to establish an emissions cap and this might
be inaccurate.198 If this is set too high, than the system will be ineffective
in reducing carbon emissions. If the cap is set too low, the costs to the
emitters will be too high and make carbon allowances more expensive on
the market. Once a cap is set, a mechanism must be instituted to determine
how allowances will be created and distributed. Free allowances will benefit
the current industries or polluters and no money will be raised. In the
alternative, a charge can be made for the allowance or the allowance can
be auctioned off.199 Third, the trading in allowances must be established,
creating a market for purchases and sales. Fourth, monitoring of the trading
must occur, to prevent fraud and punish violators.200 Fifth, to prevent cost
uncertainty banking and borrowing need to be established. Banking will
allow a holder to save its allowances for use in the future.201 Borrowing
allows the holder to emit now and pay back later by emitting less.202
However, these very mechanisms can prevent the desired certainty of
benefit. Sixth, offsets must be established for carbon sequestration. Offsets
allow the emitter to invest in forest conservation and other projects that
absorb carbon.203 Finally, to be internationally effective, the cap-and-trade
program needs to be coordinated with other cap-and-trade regimes and
carbon tax systems.204 Often, it is difficult, both politically and design-wise,
to coordinate with other systems.205
For a carbon tax, one must decide whether to tax upstream or downstream,
then set a tax rate, decide on any exemptions or credits, and monitor. Unlike
197. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 37–38.
198. Wara, supra note 154, at 261 (arguing that the U.S. energy-related carbon dioxide
emissions DOE energy model is “biased and imprecise to such a degree as to make its use
impractical”).
199. See Mann, supra note 88, at 10120.
200. Sewalk, Carbon Tax with Reinvestment Trumps Cap-and-Trade, supra note 20, at
605 (“Control must be stringent so that the same allowance cannot be used more than once.”);
see also Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 39 ([A]n elaborate mechanism would
need to be set up to distribute and collect allowances and to ensure that allowances are
real and that polluters are penalized if they emit greenhouses [sic] gases without an
allowance.”).
201. Managing Allowance Prices in a Cap-and-Trade Program, CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE at vii (Nov. 2010), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/111th-congress2009-2010/reports/11-04-2010-cap-and-trade.pdf; Mann, supra note 88, at 10121.
202. Id.
203. Mann, supra note 88, at 10121 (discussing problems of accurate measurement
of these offsets giving the example of a tropical forest in Brazil).
204. O’Connell, supra note 162; Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 38–39.
205. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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cap-and-trade, carbon taxes can be enforced by existing revenue departments.
Thus, carbon taxes are generally simpler than the cap-and-trade regime,
but do not work as well on the international level.
CHART 2. COMPARISON OF CAP-AND-TRADE AND CARBON TAX
CAP-AND-TRADE
Upstream/downstream
Set level of emissions
Determine quantity of allowances
Determine allocation of allowances
(free/fee/auction)
Create a market
Monitor emissions
Monitor market
Banking, borrowing, credits and
offsets

CARBON TAX
Upstream/downstream
Set tax
Determine Exemptions
Determine Credits
Monitor emissions

Cap-and-trade programs take a long time to get passed and implemented,206
whereas, a carbon tax can be enacted and enforced practically overnight.207
Most cap-and-trade bills are long and complicated, whereas carbon tax

206. If Waxman-Markley Cap-and-Trade passed then we would be “stuck with a
situation in which relatively little abatement was occurring, allowance price were very
low, and the prospect of report . . . was a remote possibility. By contrast, passage of a
carbon tax with prices similar to those envisioned by all parties for the allowances under
Waxman-Markey, would have led to much greater abatement than anticipated and few, or
at any rate likely unsuccessful, calls for weakening of the pollution pricing scheme. Given
the bias and variance in emission forecasts, and the sensitivity of outcomes under cap-andtrade to these projections, carbon taxes offer a much greater likelihood that all sides in a
climate regulation negotiation enjoy the benefit of the bargain.” See Wara, supra note
154, at 300. Designing real cap-and-trade programs may require information that
regulators currently do not possess and are unlikely to ever possess. Id. at 265. Given
weakness in forecast models, likely cap-and-trade not achieve the objectives that
environmentalists want. Id. at 301. At least two examples: CA RECLAIM and CA Bill
32. Id. at 293–95. “[E]vidence exists that cap-and-trade programs are vulnerable to
weakening in the face of higher than expected allowance prices.” Id. at 295.
207. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 39. “A new administration determined
to implement cap and trade would probably have to take at least two years to get the [capand-trade] program passed in Congress and set up for implementation.”
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proposals are shorter and simpler.208 The longer the text the more likely
it will not be understood—and the greater possibly of loopholes.209
Allowances under cap-and-trade raise interesting securities, tax, and
international trade issues.210 Securities issues arise with the regulation of
futures trading in allowances.211 Tax issues arise when allowances are
free, upon trading and selling of allowances, and when banking borrowing
and offsets are involved.212 World Trade Organization compliance issues
also arise with cap-and-trade.213 Carbon taxes, on the other hand, do not
raise securities or tax issues and do not pose international trade problem
because they can be collected on imports and rebated on exports and not
imposed on domestic production.214
2. Political Feasibility
At the local level, just as at the federal level, differences arise between
the traditional values of Republicans and Democrats. In general, Republicans
are reluctant to pass a tax, so a cap-and-and trade regime is probably more
politically feasible. 215 The public might also not like a tax, although
a cap-and-trade will also result in higher gas and electric bills. In general,
polls have shown that citizens have a “strong public resistance to new

208. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 38 “A carbon tax is inherently
simple: a tax is imposed at X dollars per ton of carbon content on the main sources of
carbon dioxide emissions in the economy.”
209. See Sewalk, Carbon Tax with Reinvestment Trumps Cap-and-Trade, supra note
20, at 604.
210. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 38–39.
211. See id. at 40.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 49.
214. Id.; see also Keith Kendall, Carbon Taxes and the WTO: A Carbon Charge
Without Trade Concerns?, 29 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 49, 50, 87 (2012) (“Under [a border
tax adjustment (BTA)], exports have the tax rebated, so they enter the world market free
of the carbon charge, with imports being subjected to the same impost as domestically
produced goods. In this way, the domestic policy has a neutral effect on a domestic
industry’s international competitiveness…. The major hurdle for a carbon tax to be
legitimate under the WTO is its uncertain status as an indirect tax—that is, as a tax on a
produce rather than on the producer (or the PPB). There are strong arguments in both
directions, making this the major hurdle in terms of introducing an economically appropriate
carbon tax. There is strong potential, though, that even if a carbon tax BTA were found
to violate the substantive provisions of the WTO, it may qualify for one of the exceptions
under Article XX.”).
215. See Chris Good, Norquist’s Tax Pledge: What It Is and How It Started, ABCNEWS
(Nov. 26, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/11/norquists-tax-pledge-what-itis-and-how-it-started/.
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taxes.”216 Since a tax is more transparent, it is more likely to have citizen
complaints.217 For example, a July 2014 poll showed that taxpayers in
California would not support the cap-and-trade if their gas and electric
bills would go up.218 On the other hand, the British Columbia carbon tax
has had sustained popularity even with the recession and several
administrations.219
It is possible that a cap-and-trade may be more politically acceptable
because the U.S. has already experienced a very successful permit system
under the Acid Rain Program, implemented under the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990.220 This program offered a successful model in the
trading system of sulfur-dioxide and nitrogen oxide—pollutants that cause
acid rain and smog.221 This success at the federal level could translate into
a more politically feasible regional cap-and-trade system.222
A cap-and-trade is probably more consistent with pre-existing government
environmental regulations.223 The new EPA rules under the CPP specifically
cover “market-based trading programs.”224 Although nothing in the plan
mentions carbon taxes,225 EPA officials have mentioned that local carbon
taxes would be acceptable.226 However, cap-and-trade can “more easily
216. See Keibun Mori, Washington State Carbon Tax, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF COMMERCE
1, 13 (2011), http://www.commerce.wa.gov/Documents/Washington-State-Carbon-Tax.pdf
(A disadvantage of carbon taxes is “the strong public resistance to new taxes”).
217. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at n.151.
218. Madhu Ravi, Making Sense of California’s Cap-and-Trade System, CAL. COMMON
SENSE (May 4, 2015), http://cacs.org/researc/californias-cap-and-trade-and-what-will-influenceits-future/.
219. For example, the “British Columbia carbon tax was introduced by the province’s
finance minister at the time, Carole Taylor, and was considered alongside other revenue
measures, including changes in numerous other taxes.” Wara, supra note 154, at 297, 300.
The status quo, once established, is very difficult to alter. Id.
220. Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2584 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651–7651 (1990)).
221. Id. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 34 (the program “focused on 111
facilities in the Midwest (the so-called “Big Dirties”)).
222. We Need a Well-Designed Cap-and-Trade Program to Fight Global Warming,
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (2009) [hereinafter CONCERNED SCIENTISTS], http://www.
ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/global_warming/capandtradeback
grounder.pdf.
223. Claudia O’Brien et al., supra note 191, at 5, n.56.
224. Gannett, supra note 64, at 8-3, n.15.
225. See Clean Air Act, supra note 62.
226. Coral Davenport & Peter Baker, Taking Page from Health Care Act, Obama
Climate Plan Relies on States, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2014, at A16; see also infra note 482,
at 34,832–33.
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dovetail with similar existing and proposed regimes” in other regions. 227
Thus, cap-and-trade can be regionally connected. Commentators have favored
cap-and-trade for a similar reason in the international realm.228
There is also a difference in political economy between a cap-and-trade
and a carbon tax. The legislative, administrative, and budgetary considerations
for a tax can be quite different. Taxes are passed in the legislature by a finance,
not an energy or environment committee, and are administered by the
department of revenue.229 In addition, different requirements exist for how
the funds are distributed.230 These differences were illustrated by the recent
cases challenging the CA Cap-and-Trade regime.231 In August 2013, the
courts held the cap-and-trade system was a fee and not a tax.232 As the
court said, a tax has to be passed by supermajority of the California state
legislature, a voting requirement in the state constitution.233 Fees only
need a majority in the state agency authorized in the statute.234 Here, the
state’s landmark carbon dioxide legislation of 2006 was passed by a simple
majority and granted power to the Air Resources Board (ARB), a branch of
the California Environmental Protection Agency, to establish the cap-andtrade regime.235 The court also points out another difference—revenue from
taxes can be spent on anything, such as rebates to the poor, whereas a fee
must go into programs closely aligned with the fee itself.236 Because the
purpose of the CA Cap-and-Trade is to reduce GHG, the fees from the
auctions of the permits must go into the Greenhouse Gas Reduction
Fund.237 Thus, California has struggled to make the cap-and-trade system
equitable.238
This political difference between a tax and a fee could be significant for
the states in the western United States. Oregon, like California, has a similar
227. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 38–39.
228. See Wiener, supra note 17.
229. See Surrey, supra note 18, at 728–30.
230. Id.
231. Alan Durning & Yoram Bauman, 17 Things to Know About California’s Carbon
Cap, SIGHTLINE INST. (May 22, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.sightline.org/2014/05/22/17things-to-know-about-californias-carbon-cap/.
232. Cal. Chamber of Commerce et al. v. Cal. Air Res. Bd. et al., No. 34-201280001313 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 2013), Joint ruling with Morning Star Packing Co. et
al. v. Cal. Air Res. Bd. et al., No. 34-2013-80001464 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 2013),
http://www.arb.ca.gov/html/decision_111413.pdf.
233. Durning & Bauman, supra note 231.
234. Id.
235. Id. (“AB 32 passed by a simple majority in 2006”).
236. Durning & Bauman, supra note 231.
237. Id.
238. The state got the utilities to give a rebate and have designated a 25% percentage
of the revenues to “disadvantaged communities.” Id. Solar panels on public buildings, etc.
could result, as well as mass transportation systems that could benefit the poor. Id.
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supermajority rule for new revenue measures.239 However, Washington
does not have such a requirement.240 Therefore, Washington has tremendous
flexibility in what carbon mechanism to choose. Furthermore, if they join
the CA Cap-and-Trade system, they can use the revenues to reduce the
regressive effects of the Cap-and-Trade system or in any manner they so
desire.
3. Revenue Generation
Both carbon tax and cap-and-trade can generate revenue—in money
from selling permits and with funds raised from carbon taxes. However,
if the initial permits are given away and not auctioned, then no money will
be generated. A carbon tax, however, will always result in revenue.241
Most states have to balance their budget so any new revenue could be
desirable from the state’s viewpoint.242 However, the use of the revenue
can determine the impact on efficacy, economic growth and equity. To
accomplish efficacy, the revenues should go to fund research into lowemission technologies or recycled into green practices,243 or to mass transit,
research and development, carbon sequestration, and other greenhousegas reducing efforts.244 To promote economic growth, economists often
favor a reduction in capital taxes or reduction in deficits.245 To ensure
equity, the money should be used to “shift the tax” burden off labor or
sales taxes, lessen the tax on small businesses and low-income taxpayers,
or used for lump sum rebates or refundable credits to poor households.246
In the alternative, the revenue could be used for multiple purposes.
Many of the state economic studies have run models using various
percentages for reinvestment into green practices and into a tax shift off
the poor.247 They conclude that there will be no serious impact on the
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Sewalk, Carbon Tax with Reinvestment Trumps Cap-and-Trade, supra note 20,
at 607. For example, a $10 per ton carbon tax should generate $50 billion. Id.
242. Every state but Vermont has to balance its budget.
243. Sewalk, Carbon Tax with Reinvestment Trumps Cap-and-Trade, supra note 20,
at 614 (stating the revenue could go to “building a new energy economy” and the creation
of “new jobs”).
244. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 41.
245. See infra note 259 and accomanying text.
246. See Milne, Carbon Taxes in the United States, supra note 196, at 8; see also Milne,
Environmental Taxes in the United States, supra note 18, at 439.
247. See, e.g., Liu & Renfro, supra note 140.
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economy with minimal reinvestment of the funds into green initiatives.248
The studies show that the greater the reinvestment the more adverse the
impact on the economy but the more environmentally effective the mechanism;
whereas, a greater percentage going to a tax shift would be more equitable.249
4. Efficiency or Economic Growth
One of the biggest issues with a carbon tax is the impact on business
and industry. The companies that will suffer the most from a carbon fee
or tax are those in cement, chemicals, car manufacturing, iron and steel,
aluminum, mining and oil.250 If the cost of doing business goes up for these
industries, they could move to other jurisdictions. This so-called “leakage”
can have an adverse impact on the economy and employment of the state
or region.251 However, to eliminate this negative economic effect, the carbon
systems can exempt industries (allocate free permits to them) and/or use the
revenue to reduce their taxes.
The rate of the carbon tax or the cap set on the cap-and-trade will impact
the criteria of efficiency or economic growth. In general, the higher the
rate of carbon tax or lower the emissions cap, the more adverse impact on
the economy. For example, the Congressional Budget Office estimates
that in order to decrease CO2 levels by 20% below 1990 levels, a $250 per
ton tax would be needed.252 However, if even a $50 per metric ton tax is
imposed, estimates are that U.S. gross national product will decline by as
much as $146 billion.253 With a moderate carbon tax of $20 or $30, economic
studies in several European Countries, British Columbia, and Oregon have
all shown no significant adverse impact on the economy.254
Where the revenue from the carbon tax or cap-and-trade is directed or
earmarked will also impact the criteria of efficiency or economic growth.
One study concluded that using pollution tax revenues to lower other

248.
249.
250.

Id. at 12.
Id. at 6.
Mark J. Perry, Carbon Tax Would Kill Major Industries, Hurt U.S. Consumers,
INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY (Oct. 16, 2012), http://news.investors.com/ibd-editorials-on=theright/101612-629540-carbon-tax-would-kill-off-growth-in-american-eoncomy.htm.
251. Claudia O’Brien et al., supra note 191, at 5.
252. David Kreutzer, The Impacts of Carbon Taxes on the U.S. Economy, U.S.
SENATE FIN. COMM., 3 (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Testimony%20-%20David%20Kreutzer.pdf.
253. Id. at 11–12. (discussing the costs of the Climate Security Act of 2013, which
would impose a $50 per-metric-ton tax by 2030. Kruetzer estimates that such a tax would
impose a cost of $146 billion to the US economy in the year 2030 alone).
254. See Liu & Renfro, supra note 140; but see Kreutzer, supra note 252, at 4.
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distortionary tax burdens can even improve economic performance,255 and
no decline in GNP would result.256 A study by the Economic Policy
Institute even concluded that over 2 million jobs could be created over the
next twenty years with a fifty percent reduction in U.S. carbon emissions
under alternative market approaches.257 Other economic studies258 have
shown that the most economically efficient use of the tax revenue would
be to cut taxes on capital, followed by reducing payroll taxes259 and that
recycling the revenues with lump-sum rebates to lower-income households
would have the worst economic efficiency outcomes.260
5. Equity or Incidence
The incidence, and thus the equity, of the carbon tax or cap-and-trade
will also depend on how much revenue is generated and how the revenue
is used.261 Both mechanisms will increase the energy costs to consumers
255. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 41; see also Jared Carbone et al., Getting
to an Efficient Carbon Tax: How the Revenue is Used Matters, RES. FOR THE FUTURE 35
(Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-Resources185_Feature-Carbone.etal.pdf; and Charles Komanoff, Carbon Tax Polling Milestone: 2/3
Support if Revenue Neutral, CARBON TAX CTR. (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.carbontax.
org/blogarchives/2015/04/15/carbon-tax-polling-milestone-23-support-if-revenue-neutral; but
see Oren Cass, Carbon Taxes in Revenue Fantasyland, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 30, 2015), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/carbon-taxes-in-revenue-fantasyland-1430436869.
256. Carbone et al., supra note 255, at 35.
257. Bill Dougherty et al., Clean Energy and Jobs, ECON. POLICY INST. 2 (Feb. 2002),
http://www.epi.org/files/page/-/old/studies/cleanenergyandjobs.pdf.
258. Dale W. Jorgenson et al., Carbon Taxes and Fiscal Reform in the United States,
68 NAT’L TAX J. 121 (2015); Warwick J. McKibbin et al., Carbon Taxes and U.S. Fiscal
Reform, 68 NAT’L TAX J. 139 (2015); Sebastian Rausch & John Reilly, Carbon Taxes,
Deficits and Energy Policy Interactions, 68 NAT’L TAX J. 157 (2015); Sugandha D.
Tuladhar et al., Environmental Policy for Fiscal Reform: Can a Carbon Tax Play a Role?,
68 NAT’L TAX J. 179 (2015); Roberton C. Williams III et al., The Initial Incidence of a
Carbon Tax Across Income Groups, 68 NAT’L TAX J. 195 (2015).
259. Williams, supra note 258, at 198; see also Sebastian Rausch & John Reilly, Carbon
Taxes, Deficits and Energy Policy Interactions, 68 NAT’L TAX J. 157 (2015).
260. Williams, supra note 258, at 198. A lump sum transfer or a cut in sales tax would
benefit older generations at the cost of younger generations, whereas a cut in labor taxes
would have the opposite effect. Id.
261. Id. at 210; SEBASTIAN RAUSCH, ET AL., MIT JOINT PROGRAM ON THE SCIENCE
AND POLICY OF GLOBAL CHANGE, DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS OF A U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS
POLICY: A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS OF CARBON PRICING, (Nov. 2009), http://
globalchange.mit.edu/files/document/MITJPSPGC_Rpt182.pdf. National carbon taxes may
have uneven regional impacts due to vastly differing energy structures and energy consumption
patterns from region to region. See infra note 265. The Northeast opposes taxes because
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and thus could have some inequitable impacts on lower-income taxpayers.
An American Enterprise Institute paper estimates that a tax of $15 per ton
of carbon dioxide emitted would increase the cost of a gallon of gas by 24
cents and the price of coal-fired electricity by $1.63 per kilowatt-hour.262
The Congressional Budget office estimates a 15% cut in emissions would
cost the poorest households an additional $677 a year in current dollars.263
Other studies264 also demonstrate that low-income households spend greater
percentage of their income on energy and that the distribution of the tax
revenues from a carbon tax can make the tax less regressive.265 If the consumer
can substitute public transportation for driving then the carbon mechanism
will have less of an adverse impact. However, electricity tends to be inelastic
and could have a larger impact on the consumer.266 At least a carbon tax
guarantees revenue that can be used to alleviate the burden on the poor,
whereas there is no such guarantee when the cap-and-trade constitutes a
fee.
6. Efficacy
Regional or local cap-and-trade initiatives alone will not be enough to
solve the climate change problem. Scientists say that emissions of greenhouse
gasses must be cut by at least 60% to stabilize global warming.267 Limiting
the average global temperature rise to less than 2°C “is commonly regarded
as a prerequisite to avoid dangerous climate change.”268 The investment
needed, however, in the energy sector alone, to accomplish this objective
they could increase the price of heating oil. Id. The West dislikes increase in gasoline taxes
because of greater than average driving distances. Id. The Corn-belt states are sensitive to
diesel fuel price increases due to agricultural use. Id. The Midwest and Southeast are
energy-producing and oppose any form of energy taxes. Id. In addition, the Midwest uses
electricity generated primarily by coal-fired power plants. Id.
262. Aparna Mathur & Adele Morris, Distributional Effects of a Carbon Tax in Broader
US Fiscal Reform, AM. ENTER. INST. 18 (Dec. 14, 2012), https://www.aei.org/wp-content/
uploads/2012/12/-mathur-distributional-effects-of-a-carbon-tax-in-broader-us-fiscalreform_17161031273.pdf.
263. Kevin Brady, Editorial, Who Pays for Cap and Trade?, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 9, 2009),
available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/wsj-who-pays-for-cap-and-trade/.
264. Id.; Bill Dougherty et al., supra note 257.
265. Dallas Burtraw et al., The Incidence of U.S. Climate Policy: Where You Stand
Depends on Where You Sit, RES. FOR THE FUTURE (Sept. 2008), http://www.mistra.org/
download/18.3a618cec141021343374fa7/1379435883778/Burtraw%2Bet%2Bal%2B200
8%2Ba.pdf; see also Sewalk, Carbon Tax with Reinvestment Trumps Cap-and-Trade, supra
note 20, at 607 n.175.
266. Andersen, supra note 98, at 8.
267. See Harris, supra note 38, at 197 n.8 (citing WORLD RESOURCES INST., The Difficulty
of Stabilizing Emissions, World Resources: The Urban Environment (1996–97), http://
population.wri.org/pubs_content_text.cfm?ContentID=792).
268. WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 22.
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is “estimated to be US $910 billion per annum during 2010-2050.”269
Obviously, state and local governments are not prepared to make that kind
of investment. In addition, tax rates would have to be prohibitively high
and the caps prohibitively low to get these emissions under control.270
In terms of efficacy, the key difference between a carbon tax and a capand-trade is that a cap-and-trade places a cap on emissions so there is what
is called “benefit certainty,” whereas carbon taxes set an exact price on
emissions or a cap on the costs of abatement, so there is “cost certainty.”271
The benefit certainty of the cap, however, is not an advantage if the cap is
not set accurately.272 This is the “Achilles heel” of the cap-and-trade system.273
Once the price is set, it may not be effective, as the market (such as low gas
prices) might depress the price.274 Furthermore, changing the cap might be
difficult–unless of course, it is somehow phased-in incrementally over the
years in the initial legislation.
The only way to prevent cost uncertainty in a cap-and-trade is to have
safety value mechanisms. If the market price allowances become too high,
businesses can receive or purchase at a fixed price additional allowance at
a set price from the government.275 If the cap amount “begins to seriously
hurt business and the price allowances spikes,” the cap can be lowered.276
These mechanisms, however, frustrate the efficacy or benefit of the capand-trade.
Similarly, a carbon tax cannot guarantee a certain benefit, it can just set
a price. Again, the tax rate may not be effective to impact behavior.277 If
the tax is set too low, it will not cause a reduction in carbon consumption

269. Id.
270. See Kevin Brady, supra note 263; Andersen, supra note 98.
271. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 35–37.
272. See supra pp. 72–85.
273. Rita Chandiok, Climate Change Law in California and Massachusetts: Lessons
for State Policymakers, 21 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 249, 284 (2015) (referring
to the measuring of the additionality of carbon emissions).
274. Dingell says the cap-and-trade system alone does not convey the real cost of
climate change and that companies would be allowed under cap-and-trade to spew a certain
amount of carbon dioxide into the air. See Strassel, supra note 179.
275. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 43 (“The fundamental problem is that
the reduction in the cap that is built into the cap and trade would necessarily make allowances
more expensive. How much more expensive depends on the development of future
technologies, which cannot be predicted with an accuracy over the longer time period (fifty
years or more) required for a cap and trade program to achieve its environmental goals.”).
276. Id.
277. Id.
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and if the tax is set too high, it may have adverse equity or economic
repercussions.278 Like cap-and-trade, the rates can be increased over time
with a phase-in. Arguably, the tax could be set to accomplish the benefit
desired.279 However, exemptions can also make the tax ineffective, and
credits can be given to carbon sequestration projects and other projects
that reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but dilute the price signal.280 In the
end, carbon taxes, like cap-and-trade, leave environmental outcomes
uncertain.281
Even if the revenues from the tax or cap-and-trade program go back and
are 100% reinvested in lower-carbon alternatives, such as renewable
energy, or into energy efficiency, “the efficacy of those projects is similarly
uncertain.”282 And any revenue used in this way would not be available to
mitigate the regressive impacts of such policies.283 In the end, there is no
authoritative evidence that putting a price on carbon (either through a carbon
tax or a cap-and-trade regime) by themselves will effectively reduce
emissions. 284
C. Conclusion
Both carbon tax and cap-and-trade systems can be designed to be
effective.285 Both can have strict cost-containment mechanisms: setting
a stringent cap, including all economic sources of emissions, covering all
heat-trapping gas emission, and excluding loopholes.286 Allowances can
278. Claudia O’Brien et al., supra note 191, at 4.
279. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 163, at 32–33 (“If the carbon tax did not
produce the desired reduction in carbon dioxide emissions, the tax would be increased; if
the tax “overcorrected” and produced greater than anticipated reductions, it could be
decreased.”).
280. Kenneth Johnson, Beware of the Dogmatist: A consensus perspective on the
Tax-versus-Cap debate (Working Paper Series 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstact
=1154638 (“[The] price stability [of a carbon tax] could theoretically be five times more
cost-efficient than cap-and-trade.”).
281. Claudia O’Brien et al., supra note 191, at 4.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Sewalk, Carbon Tax with Reinvestment Trumps Cap-and-Trade, supra note 20,
at 609 (“[B]oth carbon tax and cap-and-trade bills have failed to give proof of any real
emission reductions. . . . There is no firm data to show that putting a price on carbon will
reduce emissions. The EU-ETS has created a carbon market, but the successes are
economical rather than environmental.”).
285. The effectiveness of MMs depends on: the number of regulated sources, the
physical and chemical nature of a regulated pollutant, the range of technology option
available, the existence of cost-effective monitoring, reporting and verification systems,
adaptive decision-making process, etc. See CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, supra note 222.
286. These would include carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons,
perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride. See id. at 2.
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be auctioned off and revenue used for the public good. Although emissions
have been reduced by these market mechanism, they have not been reduced
enough.287 A cap-and-trade program is thus alone “not sufficient to meet
the challenges of climate change.”288 Therefore, we need local carbon
taxes in addition to regional level cap-and-trade, but other policies are also
needed. We should require utilities to provide a greater percentage of their
electricity from renewable energy sources, require automakers and producers
of appliances to increase performance standards, and mandate stronger
energy efficiency for new and existing buildings.289 In addition, policies
should be established to create positive tax incentives for good behavior.
We should promote conservation, encourage smart growth, and provide
incentives for investment in low-carbon or renewable technologies.290
Lastly, we need to eliminate the bad policies, such as the removal of fossil
fuel subsidies, at the federal level and the perverse corporate welfare
subsidies at the local level.291 A comprehensive approach is what is needed
to solve our climate change crisis.
III. WESTERN NORTH AMERICAN CLIMATE CHANGE INITIATIVES
Because of the failure of binding climate change law at the international
and U.S. federal government levels, the market-based initiatives at the
regional, state and local level can offer some hope to solve our climate
change problems. This part of the Article looks at U.S. regional cap-andtrade systems, and then examines state and local carbon taxes, focusing
on British Colombia, Boulder, San Francisco, Oregon, and Washington.
A. Regional Cap-and-Trade Initiatives
The history of regional cap-and-trade programs in the U.S. has been
rather tumultuous. California set up a cap-and-trade system, which originally
287. See id.
288. Id.
289. See Shurtz, supra note 10.
290. CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, supra note 222. Energy efficiency certificate trading
are also needed. For example, the Union of Concerned Scientists say: The government
must implement parallel policies alongside a cap-and-trade regime to ensure development
and deployment of the full range of clean technologies Studies have shown that a
comprehensive approach including these parallel policies would lower the price for
allowances, cut emissions, and save consumers money by lowering their electric and
gasoline bills. Id. at 4.
291. See WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 23.
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included six Western states and two Canadian provinces but now includes
only California and Québec.292 The Chicago Climate Exchange founded
in 2003 boasted big company participants like Ford, Amtrak, but went
defunct in 2010.293 The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI),
established in 2005, has had New Jersey withdraw, and had to shrink its
cap by 45%.294
1. The Western Climate Initiative Has Failed
The Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 set goals for California to reduce
its greenhouse gas.295 In 2007, Governors Arnold Schwarzenegger of California,
Bill Richardson of New Mexico, Ted Kulongoski of Oregon and Christine
Gregoire of Washington signed an agreement, called the Western Climate
Initiative (WCI).296 Later the governors of Utah and Montana and the premiers
of British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario and Québec joined as partners.297 An
additional 14 jurisdictions joined including Alaska, Colorado, Idaho,
Kansas, Nevada, Wyoming and the Canadian provinces of Nova Scotia
and Saskatchewan and even Mexican states of Baja Chihuahua, Coahuila
Nuevo León, Sonara and Tamaulipas.298 In September 2008, the WCI released a
document calling for economy-wide emission program covering “nearly 90%
of the region’s greenhouse gas emissions.”299 The program was to reduce
emissions 15% below 2005 levels by 2020 and start mandatory emission
monitoring starting January 2010.300 Under the WCI, each state and province
agreed to set up their own cap-and-trade regime and link with the other
292. Multi-State Climate Initiatives, CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS, http://
www.c2es.org/us-states-regions/regional-climate-initiatives [hereinafter CCES] (last visited
Dec. 31, 2015); Michael Hiltzik, Emissions Cap-and-Trade Program is Working Well in
California, L.A. TIMES (June 12, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fihiltzik-20150613-column.html.
293. See generally Ilan Gutherz, Current Developments in Carbon & Climate Law
North America: United States, 8 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 69, 70 (2014).
294. Id. (“[RGGI] announced that it would reduce the available number of GHG
allowances for 2014 by 45 percent to correct for a significant oversupply in the market.
The cap will be reduced by 2.5 % annually through 2020”).
295. The California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, ch. 488, 2006 CAL. STAT.
3419 (to be codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38500 et seq.).
296. Western Climate Initiative Work Plan: October 2007–August 2008, W. CLIMATE
INITIATIVE 2 (Oct. 29, 2007), http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/document-archives/
general/workplans/2008-WCI-Work-Plan/.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 3; see also CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS, supra note 295;
and Design for the WCI Regional Program, W. CLIMATE INITIATIVE (July 2010), http://
www.westernclimateinitiative.org/the-wci-cap-and-trade-program/program-design [hereinafter
WCI Design].
300. WCI Design, supra note 299, at 5.
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systems. Each jurisdiction could verify the other jurisdiction’s program. 301
In addition, they agreed to share information and management in support
of such a system.302 Nevertheless, unresolved issues arose, “including
allowance apportionment between the states and among the sectors,
percentages of allowances to be auctioned, design and structure of both
the auction market and the market oversight and enforcement mechanisms
to address market manipulation, and the use of offsets.”303
From 2008 to 2011, the WCI began to fall apart.304 First, elections occurred
in Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah, whose new governors opposed capand-trade.305 Second, state legislatures in Washington, Oregon, and Montana
failed to enact carbon trading schemes. 306 Third, the Great Recession
occurred. Finally, in November 2011, six states withdrew from the WCI.307
In that same month, in an attempt to salvage the plan, the Western Climate
Initiative, a nonprofit corporation was formed.308 Its function now is limited
to providing “administrative and technical support to state and provincial
governments” implementing cap-and-trade programs.309 On the whole, the
Western Climate Initiative has failed.
2. It is Too Early to Pronounce the CA Cap-and-Trade
Program a Success
The current CA Cap-and-Trade program was implemented under the
Global Warming Solutions Act under AB32, the state’s landmark carbon
dioxide legislation of 2006. 310 The ARB is in charge of its design and
implementation.311 The cap-and-trade covers the “broadest range of industries
301. Id. at 2–3.
302. Gannett, supra note 64, at 8-4.
303. Warren & Tomashefsky, supra note 171, at 57.
304. Gannett, supra note 64, at 8-5.
305. Geoffrey Craig, Six US States Leave the Western Climate Initiative, PLATTS,
(Nov. 18, 2011, 4:15 PM EST), http://www.platts.ru/latest-news/electric-power/washington/sixus-states-leave-the-western-climate-initiative-6695863.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. History, W. CLIMATE INITIATIVE, http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/history (last
visited May 5, 2016).
309. See CCES, supra note 292.
310. Assembly Bill 32 Overview, CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, AIR RES. BD. (Aug. 5,
2014), http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ab32/ab32.htm.
311. The California Air Resources Boards’ Climate Change Scoping Plan Updates
the past five years and outlook. Id. Looking ahead—collaborative efforts with others, allocation
rules, market program and offset program implementation. WORLD BANK, supra note 22,
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of any such program in North America,” including transportation.312 Over
85% of California’s GHG emissions are covered by the regime.313
Because of interstate commerce issues the program does not cover planes
or ships with destinations beyond the state border.314 It does cover “carbon
by wire”—emissions from out-of-state coal and natural gas plants that sell
electricity into the state’s grid.315 Exemptions also occur for agricultural
and food producers.316
The cap-and-trade system is fairly straightforward and simple. It is
imposed upstream on some 600 companies.317 It provides for banking but
not borrowing.318 The trading is tightly regulated so gaming is unlikely.319
The ARB carefully restricts and monitor offsets, which have to be thirdparty verified.320 Firms can substitute offsets for reforestation programs and
methane recapture from livestock manure for 8% of their emissions permits.321
Allocation of permits were not grandfathered, but based on a combination
of free allowances and auctioned ones. In 2013 and 2014, the ARB distributed
about 90% of the permits free of charge.322 These free permits were given
to large industrial firms whose products compete with products from
outside of California and to large electric and natural gas utilities.323 In
addition, extra permits were given to companies that had been the most
successful in reducing their emissions.324 When the cap expands in 2015,
most of the new permits—those for petroleum and other fuels, will be
auctioned.325 CA Cap-and-Trade does not allow waivers and exemptions
but has a price containment reserve that holds back a few percent of permits

at 57; see also Hiltzik, supra note 292 (noting that this legislation included mandates for
renewable fuels and emissions standards for new vehicles).
312. Hiltzik, supra note 292; see also Durning & Bauman, supra note 231 (“[C]ap
will be the most comprehensive, though not the most aggressive, carbon-pricing regime in
the world.”).
313. Durning & Bauman, supra note 231.
314. Id.
315. Id. (pointing out the comparison between BC, which only covers only fossil
fuel, and Northeast Regional and EU that only cover electricity, but that California covers
both plus “carbon by wire.”).
316. See id.
317. Id.
318. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
319. Durning & Bauman, supra note 231.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 3–4.
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in reserve so that if the carbon prices rise too high, these permits can go
to auction.326
It is too early to make statements as to the regime’s effectiveness. 327
However, the markets have been working effectively with current prices
around $12.73.328 Approximately $3.5 billion of revenue was raised since
2012.329 The system has been linked to Québec and plans are in the works
to link with Ontario and the EU ETS.330
One aim of the CA Cap-and-Trade is to reduce the state’s carbon emissions
to 1990 levels by 2020.331 To meet these 1990 levels emissions must be
cut by almost 16%.332 However, the cap was initially set too high and the prices
remained exceptionally low.333 The cap is restricted to a ceiling of approximately
$40-50 so as not to harm the California economy.334 In addition, a price
floor exists ($11.34 in 2014 dollars). A floor price is set which rises slightly
each year and the total supply of emissions permits will decline by 2-3 %
per year until 2020.335 Governor Brown is advocating more stringent
targets for 2020-2030. He issued a nonbinding executive order to reduce
emissions an additional 80% by 2050.336Another aim of the cap-and-trade
326. Id. at 9.
327. Id. at 2. Durning and Bauman note that California’s emission rose from 1996 to
2007 and then dropped during the Great Recession. Id. To return to 1990 levels by 2020
will require a 5% drop below the 2011 levels. Because California’s population continues
growing quickly, emissions per capital will have to be reduced even more. Mary D. Nichols,
the chairwoman of the California Air Resources Board, which administers cap-and-trade,
states that “[a]t $12 a ton . . . ‘that’s enough of a signal for industries to make dramatic
investments in clean energy.’” Hiltzik, supra note 292. However this is disputed by
Severin Borenstein, an energy expert at UC Berkeley’s Haas School of Business in the
same article. Id.
328.
CALFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD, CA Cap-and-Trade Program and Québec
Cap-and-Trade System February 2016 Joint Auction #6 Summary Results Report 4 (Feb.
17, 2016), http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/auction/feb-2016/summary_results_report.pdf.
329. Id. at 3.
330. See CCES, supra note 292 (“As of January 1, 2014, California’s program is linked
to that of Québec”); see also Malin Ahlberg et al., Linking Different Emissions Trading
Systems—Current State and Future Perspectives, GER. EMISSIONS TRADING AUTH. 1, 8, 11
(May 2013), http://www.rnei.de/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/ETS-Current-State-and-FuturePerspectives.pdf (discussing the prospects of linking California’s Cap-and-Trade to Ontario’s
and the EU ETS’).
331. See Durning & Bauman, supra note 231.
332. Id.
333. Ravi, supra note 218.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Durning & Bauman, supra note 231.
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system is “to encourage other governments to act to combat rising GHG.”337
California produces 1% to 1.5% of the world’s greenhouse gases,338 so even
if California reduces its emission, other governments need to join them to
make an effective difference in the world. As of January 2014, only Québec
and California have linked their programs.339 Allowances in California are
expected to drive the price in the two jurisdictions.340
Thus far, the system has had no adverse impacts on the economy, although
the price of gas did go up around 10 cents.341 The revenues collected through
2014 were $969 million and an estimated $3.4 to $10.3 billion more could
be collected by 2020.342 All funds from the auctions go into the Greenhouse
Gas Reduction Fund,343 which focuses on (1) sustainable communities and
clean transportation, (2) energy efficiency and clean energy, and (3) natural
resource and waste diversion.344 Twenty-five percent of the funds are to
go into the high-speed rail from L.A. to San Francisco, 35% into disadvantaged
communities and some mass-transit, and 40% to the state legislature to
decide where the remaining funds should go.345
A July 2014 poll found that the majority of Californians would not
support a cap-and-trade if it meant paying more for electricity or gas.346
The program will inevitably cause a rise in utility bills. Although some
consumers may be able to reduce their use of cars and substitute mass
transportation, electricity is inelastic and consumers cannot easily change
their behavior and substitute another product.347 The California Legislative
Analyst’s Office estimates that gas prices will rise “between 13 and 50 cents

337. Ravi, supra note 218.
338. Hiltzik, supra note 292 (stating California produces 1% of world’s greenhouse
gases); but see Ravi, supra note 218 (stating 1.5%).
339. Gutherz, supra note 293, at 70; see also WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 57.
340. See Gutherz, supra note 293, at 70 (“Québec’s carbon market is significantly
smaller than California’s, the demand for allowances in the California market is expected
to drive price in the two jurisdictions”).
341. Severin Borenstein, Op-Ed, Learning to Love Paying 10 Cents More Per Gallon,
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-borenstein-gasprices-emissions-20141214-story.html (stating that California’s oil and gas industry predicted
that it would drive up gas prices 16 to 76 cents per gallon); see also Chandiok, supra note
273, at 265–66 (“California’s successes . . . are a guide for other states who are trying to
design a climate change law that will survive the inevitable legal challenges.”).
342. Ravi, supra note 218; see also Durning & Bauman, supra note 231 (study states
$2 billion a year for the rest of this decade).
343. Durning & Bauman, supra note 231 (“AB 32 passed by simple majority in 2006,
granting power to ARB to establish a cap and trade.”). Thus, a state agency can impose
fees authorized by simple majorities. Id.
344. WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 114.
345. Ravi, supra note 218.
346. Id.
347. Warren & Tomashefsky, supra note 171, at 59.
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per gallon by 2020” and electric bills “could rise between 5% and 12%.”348
And because this is a fee and not a tax, no rebates or tax shifting off labor
are allowed.349 If enough voters oppose the cap-and-trade, it could be repealed.
Thus, it is too soon to declare this program a success.
3. The Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord Has Failed
The Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord (MGGRA) or
Midwestern Accord, was established in 2007 and covered six U.S. states
(Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin) and one
Canadian province (Manitoba).350 Another three U.S. states and one Canadian
province were formally observing this process.351 Under the Accord, the
members agreed to set up a multi-sector cap-and trade system and meet
targets of 60–80% below 2007 emission levels.352 In early 2008, participating
jurisdictions appointed an Advisory Group comprised of representatives
from environmental groups, industry and participating jurisdictions to
develop recommendations on a regional cap-and-trade program.353 In
May 2009, the Advisory Group released their draft of final design
recommendations.354 After releasing their draft in April 2010, “the states
and province in MGGRA did not continue pursuing their greenhouse gas
goals under the Accord.”355 Thus, the Midwestern initiative has failed.
4. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Has Been a Success
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) was established in 2005
and has been the most successful cap-and-trade in North America.356 It
348. Id.
349. Durning & Bauman, supra note 231. Still, the California Public Utility Commission
ordered Pacific Gas and Electric to give “climate credits” averaging $35 to residential customers
for several months a years. Id.
350. CCES, supra note 292.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Chris Lau & Nicholas Bianco, The Bottom Line on Regional Cap-and-Trade
Programs, 13 WORLD RES. INST. 1, 2 (July 2009), available at http://www.wri.org/sites/
default/files/pdf/bottom_line_regional_cap_and_trade.pdf.
354. CCES, supra note 292.
355. Id.
356. Id.; Jason Brown, RGGI States Make Major Cuts to Greenhouse Gas Emissions
from Power Plants, REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE (Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.rggi.
org/docs/PressReleases/PR011314_AuctionNotice23.pdf; Chandiok, supra note 273, at
n.197 (citing Overview of RGGI CO2 Budget Trading Program, REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS

109

SHURTZ(ADA) (DO NOT DELETE)

9/29/2016 10:31 AM

initially covered ten Northeast and Mid-Atlantic States (Connecticut, Delaware,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
Rhode Island and Vermont). It aims to reduce emissions from electric power
and thus applies only to emission from regulated fossil fuel power plants
that “together produce 95% of the region’s electric-generation carbon
emissions.”357 Importantly, it did not include the transportation, agriculture,
commercial and residential sectors of the economy. Thus, it is more limited
in scope than the CA Cap-and-Trade.
Under the RGGI, each state limits emissions, issues allowances and
encourages participation in regional auctions.358 Thus, state programs are
integrated into a single regional market for carbon emissions. RGGI, like
the California program, included banking allowances and soft price ceilings
and a minimum auction price.359 Unlike the EU Cap-and-Trade program,
however, the majority of the allowances were auctioned off in 2008.360
Subsequent auctions have occurred quarterly. So far, these auctions have
earned more than $1.5 billion since 2009 and over 80% of the revenue has
gone back to programs in renewable energy projects, energy efficiency
programs and other initiatives to benefit the consumer.361
RGGI can be applauded for its flexibility in making changes to its cap.
The cap was criticized because it was set too high and thus the prices were
seen as too low.362 Thus, RGGI updated and reduced the cap by 45% in
January 2014.363 The cap was set at 188 million short tons of carbon for
the first control period (2009-2011) and then reduced to 91 million short
tons.364 The cap will be reduced by 2.5% each year from 2015 to 2020.365
Some say this “increase in stringency is dramatic and represents evidence”
that cap-and-trade systems can be subsequently modified.366 Others might
INITIATIVE 2 (Oct. 2007), http://www.rggi.org/doc/program_summer_10_07.pdf); Regulated
Sources, REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, https://www.rggi.org/design/overview/regulated
_sources (last visited Jan. 1, 2016).
357. Gannett, supra note 64, at 7; Overview of RGGI CO2 Budget Trading Program,
REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE 2 (Oct. 2007), http://www.rggi.org/doc/program_
summer_10_07.pdf.
358. Overview of RGGI CO2 Budget Trading Program, supra note 356, at 4.
359. Gannett, supra note 64, at 7–8.
360. Id.
361. Id.; Chandiok, supra note 273, at 275 n.198.
362. See Gutherz, supra note 293, at n.8 (citing The RGGI CO2 Cap, REG’L GREENHOUSE
GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/docs/program_summary_10_07.pdf (last visited Jan. 1,
2016)).
363. WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 58 (“The new 2014 cap is 91 million short tons
of CO2, representing a 45% reduction form the previous cap”).
364. Id.
365. Id.; The cost containment reserve CR was triggered for the first time in March
2014. Id.
366. Wara, supra note 154, at 35.

110

SHURTZ(ADA) (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 7: 61, 2015–16]

9/29/2016 10:31 AM

Carbon Pricing Initiatives
SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW

say the cap is too low—that by 2020, we must cut 15 to 20% off current
levels, and the RGGI decline does not meet that standard.367 Empirical studies
have shown that the emissions were 40% lower than in 2005; however,
many factors were cited as contributing to this reduction.368
The RGGI economies have grown. An independent study by the Analysis
Group projected positive economic outcomes including $1.6 billion in net
economic benefits, $1.1 billion in electricity bill savings for consumers,
16,000 additional jobs, and $765 million retained in local economies due
to reduced fossil fuel demand.369 Despite this favorable economic report,
New Jersey, with the urging of Governor Christie, withdrew from the
program in 2011.370 In New Hampshire, the House tried to end the state
participation in RGGI by 2015 and a compromise was passed in the Senate
stating that if two other New England states withdraw then New Hampshire
will withdraw.371 In addition, a conservative group tried to block New York’s

367. CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, supra note 222.
368. Richard Cowart, Carbon Caps and Efficiency Resources: How Climate Legislation
can Mobilize Efficiency and Lower the Cost of Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction, 33
VT. L. REV. 202, 213–18 (2008). The power sector’s greenhouse gas emissions are more
than 40% lower in the RGGI region than they were in 2005. Id. at 213. There are many
factors that contribute to this reduction, including improved energy efficiency measures, a
broad switch from coal and oil to natural gas use in power plants, carbon price signals, and
regulatory predictability. Id.
369. Paul Hibbard et al., The Economic Impacts of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
on Nine Northeast and Mid-Atlantic States, ANALYSIS GRP., 1, 11, 19 (July 14, 2015),
http://www.analysisgroup.com/uploadedfiles/content/insights/publishing/analysis_group
_rggi_report_july_2015.pdf.
370. Harriet Shugarman, Fact Sheet: The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, (RGGI),
N.J. P UB . P OL ’ Y N ETWORK 1, 2 (Nov. 11, 2011), http://uulmnj.org/wp-content/
uploads/rggi_fact_sheet.pdf. New Jersey Governor Chris Christie stated that “our analysis
of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative or RGGI reveals that this program is not
effective in reducing greenhouse gases and is unlikely to be in the future.” Id. The governor
called it a “failure” because of low auction prices and industry’s ease of compliance. Id.
Several environmental groups challenged the governor’s actions, with some success. See
Jonathan D. Salant, Christie’s withdrawal from air pollution compact has cost N.J. $114M,
Pallone says, NJ ADVANCE MEDIA FOR NJ.COM (Mar. 18, 2015, 12:11 AM), http://www.nj.com/
politics/index.ssf/2015/03/rep_pallone_says_christies_withdrawal_from_regiona.html. See
also Chris Fallon, Appeals Panel: Christie Administration Improperly Pulled N.J. Out of
Program to Cut Greenhouse Gas Emissions, NORTHJERSEY.COM (Mar. 25, 2014, 5:33 PM),
http://www.northjersey.com/news/appeals-panel-christie-administration-improperly-pulledn-j-out-of-program-to-cut-greenhouse-gas-emissions-1.750770.
371. Matthew Spolar, Negotiators Reach RGGI Deal, CONCORD MONITOR, May 26,
2012, http://www.concordmonitor.com/article/332107/negotiators-reach-rggi-deal.
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participation but this failed.372 Despite these minor glitches, the RGGI seems
to be going strong and must be considered a success.373
5. Conclusion
What we can learn from these emissions trading programs is their success
will largely depend on the political will of the state, the administrative
details of the program (its scope, the cap, the allocation approach, use of
offsets, price stabilization mechanisms, and enforcement) its performance
and effectiveness, its ability to be flexible given the need for change based
on competitiveness or efficacy concerns, and its ability to link to other
systems. What is needed is for the original signers of the Western Climate
Change to join the California and Québec Cap-and-Trade systems. Then,
California should link to Alberta, Ontario and other state and provinces in
North America. The Midwestern initiative should be revived and RGGI
should be expanded to cover transportation. All systems should be
coordinated with similar auction allowances, sector coverage, and cap limits.374
North America needs to be the leader in the reduction of carbon dioxide
emissions.375 Canada and the U.S. have been some of the largest polluters
of carbon and will also be some of the biggest beneficiaries from the melting
ice. Since the impact of climate change will fall mainly on poor countries,
it is imperative that the richer countries take the lead in these climate
initiatives.
372. John C. Dernbach et al., United States: Making the States Full Partners in a National
Climate Change Effort: A Necessary Element for Sustainable Economic Development,
MONDAQ (Aug. 2010), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/103786/Climate+Change/
Making+the+States+Full+Partners+in+a+National+Climate+Change+Effort+A+Necessa
ry+Element+for+Sustainable+Economic+Development+.
373. Wara, supra note 154, at 293. “(O)verallocation and a general lack of stringency
are serious concerns in many cap-and-trade programs.” Id. However, if they become too
stringent then evidence exists that programs will be weakened (i.e., RECLAIM and CA
Bill 32). WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 58. The RGGI states have submitted comments
to the EPA in relation to the Clean Air Act, advocating flexibility in how states approach
carbon pollution, emphasizing market-based approach over a regulatory approach and
emphasizing the need to reward early actors. Rob Klee et al., RGGI States’ Comments on
Proposed Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE 1 (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.
rggi.org/docs/PressReleases/PR110714_CPP_Joint_Comments.pdf.
374. WORLD BANK, supra note 22 at 58. Fifty percent of the total GHG emissions in
Alberta are covered by the Alberta Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program. Facilities that
emit more than 0.1Mt CO2e per year are required to reduce their emissions by 12% or buy
permits. Id. at 42.
375. Id. Alberta Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program could also be linked, but
challenges include political aversion to “new taxes,” the powerful fossil fuel interest
groups, and divergent and diffuse interests of the public. However, looming deficits and
real environmental concerns could result in change.
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B. State and Province Carbon Tax and Other Initiatives
Some states in the U.S. and provinces in Canada have established creative
climate change initiatives. Some of these are merely aspirational in tone.
However, others, such as carbon taxes in British Columbia, Boulder and
San Francisco, have been effective in reducing CO2 emissions with minimal
economic impact. This section examines those initiatives.
1. Many State and Local Initiatives are Merely Aspirational
Climate change initiatives at the local level have tended to focus on GHG
mitigation.376 Cities work with International Council for Local Environmental
Initiatives (ICLEI),377 the Mayors Climate Protection Agreement (MCPA),378
and C40 Cities (a climate leadership group),379 to inventory emissions,
develop climate action plans, and pursue sustainable development goals.
States and regions have also signed agreements to fight climate change.
All of these initiatives are voluntary and thus do not by themselves guarantee
effective climate change policy.380 However, like the countries in the
recent COP 21, local governments can band together with other cities and
become agents for change in the world war against climate change.
The Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICIEI) “serves as a
clearinghouse on sustainable development and environmental protection
policies, programs, and techniques, initiates joint projects or campaigns
among groups of local governments, organizes training programs, and
publishes reports and technical manuals on the art of environmental
management practices.”381 As of October 2015, more than one thousand
376. See Trisolini, supra note 15, at 679.
377. ICLEI Members, INT’L COUNCIL FOR LOCAL ENVTL. INITIATIVES (ICLEI), http://www.
iclei.org (last visited Jan. 1, 2016); see also Mayors Leading the Way on Climate Protection,
MAYORS CLIMATE PROT. CTR. (2009), http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/revised.
378. This initiative should be contrasted with the EU Covenant of Mayors which has
“a more binding nature.” See Dellinger, supra note 16, at 632 (“But whereas the Covenant
appears to be both procedurally and substantively successful, more action needs to be
demonstrated by the MCPA and GreenClimateCities before these can reasonably be
determined to be effective. . .”).
379. C40 CITIES, http://www.c40cities.org/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2016).
380. See Duff, supra note 9, at 2075–76 (stating that these voluntary agreements have
their place in the global warming fight).
381. International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI), SUSTAINABLE
CMTYS. ONLINE (2016), http://www.sustainable.org/creating-community/inventories-andindicators/149-international-council-for-local-environmental-initiatives-iclei; see also Green
ClimateCities Program: A Pathway to Urban Low-Carbon Development, INT’L COUNCIL
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cities were members of ICLEI, including Portland, Seattle, San Francisco
and other major cities in Western North America and around the globe.382
ICLEI’s first initiative was the Cities for Climate Protection (CCP)
campaign that focused on the following five “milestones”: (1) require a
baseline emissions inventory; (2) set forth an emissions reduction target
for the forecast year; (3) develop a local plan of action by involving
community stakeholders; (4) implement the plan and policies; and (5)
monitor and verify results.383 Unfortunately, these last steps are still lacking
in many places.384 ICLEI’s newest initiative, launched in June 2012, is the
GreenClimateCities Program.385 Here, a three-step approach is adopted: (1)
analyzation (again doing a GHG inventory, identify opportunities for
emissions reduction, etc.), (2) action (develop a mitigation and adaptation
action plan, identify finances for projects, etc.), and (3) acceleration (measure
progress and report on achievements).386 As a result of their effort, “232
cities from 25 countries . . . reported 561 climate and energy commitments,
557 GHG inventories, and a total of 2092 mitigation and adaptation
actions.”387 The problem is that all of this is voluntary with no enforcement
method to assure compliance, other than the “threat of potential public
scorn.”388 To conclude: ICLEI is just “too new to demonstrate any substantive
success.”389 However, in the absence of binding global and federal
initiatives, it is definitely a promising program.
The Mayors Climate Protection Agreement (MCPA) has been adopted
by over one thousand mayors, within all 50 of the states (plus the District
of Columbia and Puerto Rico.)390 Again, the mayors of Seattle, Portland,
and San Francisco have signed this simple one-page agreement.391 The
agreement strives to beat the Kyoto Protocol target of 7% GHG reduction
within the city and urges the mayors to try to get their state and federal
LOCAL ENVTL. INITIATIVES, http://www.iclei.org/fileadmin/PUBLICATIONS/Brochures/
ICLEI_GreenClimateCities_Brochure.pdf.
382. Local Governments for Sustainability, INT’L COUNCIL FOR LOCAL ENVTL.
INITIATIVES, http://www.iclei.org/iclei-members/iclei-members.html (last visited Jan. 2,
2016).
383. Five Milestones of Emissions Management, INT’L COUNCIL FOR LOCAL ENVTL.
INITIATIVES, http://www.iciei.org/index.php?id=810 (last visited May 4, 2016).
384. See Dellinger, supra note 16, at 634.
385. Id. at 635.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 636.
388. Id. at 636–37.
389. Id. at 637.
390. List of Participating Mayors, MAYORS CLIMATE PROT. CTR. (2007), http://www.
usmayors.org/climateprotection/list.asp.
391. Id.; see also The U.S. Conference of Mayors Climate Protection Agreement—
Signature Page, THE U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/
mayorsclimateagreementsignaturepage.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2016).
FOR
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governments (including the U.S. Congress) to enact GHG reduction
legislation.392 Unfortunately, the 7% target reduction now needs to be
increased “tenfold.”393 Thus, the MCPA “appears to have become more of
a political public relations tool than an agreement with much real bite.”394
The C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group is also a voluntary group of
cities concerned with climate change. Now in its 10th year, it includes over
75 cities in its membership, covering over 500 million people and one
quarter of the world’s economy.395 It focuses on “tackling climate change
and driving urban action that reduces greenhouse gas emissions and climate
risks, while increasing the health wellbeing and economic opportunities
of urban citizens.” 396 As a primer to the recent meeting in Paris, C40
showcased research and stories “that help explain why a global agreement
on climate change matters, and why cities are so important to the success
of any agreement.”397
In addition to the aspirational city initiatives,398 many state and regional
initiatives exist at the state and regional level in western North America.
For example, in 2008, The Pacific Coast Collaborative (PCC), was
established and signed by Alaska, British Columbia, Washington, Oregon
and California.399 The aim here is to promote clean energy innovation and
low-carbon developments to reduce climate change in the region. Through
the PCC, jurisdictions hope to “coordinate, propose, and adopt polic y
frameworks aimed at generating investment in renewable energy, climate
resilience, low-carbon transportation infrastructure, and environmental
conservation.”400 Then, in 2009, California, Washington and Oregon signed
a climate change pact with British Columba stating their intent to implement
cap-and-trade programs, and achieve long-term reductions in GHG
emissions.401 While not binding, this pact represents a commitment to
392.

U.S. Conference of Mayors Climate Protection Agreement, THE U.S. CONFERENCE
http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/agreement.htm.
393. Dellinger, supra note 16, at 633.
394. Id.
395. About C40, C40 CITIES, http://www.c40.org/about (last visited Jan. 8, 2016).
396. Id.
397. C40 CITIES, supra note 395.
398. See Kenneth Abbott, Arizona State University, Presentation at the Seventh Annual
San Diego Climate and Energy Law Symposium (Nov. 6, 2015).
399. CCES, supra note 292, at § 4.
400. Id.
401. Paul Rogers, Climate Change Pact Signed by California, Oregon, Washington
and British Columbia, S AN JOSE M ERCURY NEWS, Oct. 29. 2013, http://www.mercury
news.com/ci_24406734/california-oregon-washington-andbritish-columbia-sign-climate;
OF MAYORS (2008),
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multilateral cooperation and, like the other initiatives, is hopeful but not
binding.402 Thus, it appears that many cities are following the global approach,
which is just to enter into nonbinding “soft” agreements that can easily by
avoided.
2. Some State and Local Carbon Taxes Have Been Successful
Luckily, some state and local initiatives in the Western North America
are more binding. Those would include the provincial carbon tax in British
Columbia and the local carbon taxes in Boulder, Colorado and San Francisco,
California. This section also highlights the proposed carbon taxes in Oregon
and Washington.
a. British Columbia
In July 2008, British Columbia introduced its carbon tax.403 The BC
carbon tax is just one of the key parts of the Climate Action Plan to reduce
BC’s GHG emissions by 33% below 2007 levels by 2020.404 The BC tax
see also Pacific Coast Action Plan on Climate and Energy, PAC. COAST COLLABORATIVE
(Oct. 28, 2013), http://www.pacificcoastcollaborative.org/Documents/Pacific%20Coast%20
Climate%20Action%20Plan.pdf.
402. John Stegman, Cooperative State Cap and Trade to Mitigate Climate Change,
55 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 215, 225–26 n.67 (2015).
403. Carbon Tax, B.C., M INISTRY OF F IN. (2015), http://www.fin.gov.bc.ca/tbs/tp/
climate/carbon_tax.htm. Québec and Alberta have similar taxes but they are limited. See
Mori, supra note 216. British Columbia combines several policies to reduce GHG
emissions by 33% by 2020 and by 80% by 2050, compared to 2007 levels. Climate Action,
B.C., M INISTRY OF TRANSP . & INFRASTRUCTURE , http://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/
transportation/transportation-environment/climate-action (last visited May 4, 2016).
404. WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 86. British Columbia successfully implemented
the GHG reduction initiative in the transportation sector by imposing a parking fee, the
proceeds of which are used to offer incentives to City employees to encourage them to carpool,
walk or bike, or take public transportation to work. See Sustainable Commuting, CITY OF
VANCOUVER, http://vancouver.ca/green-vancouver/sustainable-commuting-for-staff.aspx
(last visited Apr. 11, 2016). British Columbia’s Sustainable Commuting Program offers:
1. Rebates on transit passes;
2. Monthly incentives and access to reserved parking for staff who share rides;
3. Incentives for biking, walking, skateboarding, and rollerblading, such as gift cards
for rain gear;
4. Cycling skills courses and subsidized bike tune-ups; and a “guaranteed ride home”
program in the event of emergency or sickness.
See Campus & Community Planning, Transportation Options, THE UNIV. OF B.C., http://
planning.ubc.ca/vancouver/transportation-planning/transportation-options (last visited Jan.
2, 2016). British Columbia has also recently created a program called LiveSmart on the
Road. See LiveSmart on the Road, LIVESMART BC (2015), http://www.livesmartbc.ca/
road. The LiveSmart on the Road program provides incentives for people to scrap old,
inefficient cars instead of selling them and provides additional incentives for people who
buy clean-energy vehicles under a component program called the Clean Energy Vehicle
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has at least four core features that have remained the same as when first
enacted and have contributed to its success.405
First, the tax is broad based—taxing twenty carbon-based fossil fuels,
each at different rates.406 It covers “approximately three-quarters of all the
GHG emissions in the province.”407 Some legitimate leakage occurs with
exemptions in the agriculture sector and for marine and aviation fuels.408
Essentially the tax exempts fuel in interstate commerce and exported out
of the province and taxes fuels coming in and being used in the province.409
Despite its broad base, the tax has been criticized as it does not apply to
certain industrial processes.410 These exemptions were based on the prospect
Point of Sale Incentive Program. See Transportation Rebates and Incentives, LIVESMART
BC (2015), http://www.livesmartbc.ca/incentives/transportation/CEV-rebates.html. As
part of the LiveSmart on the Road program, British Columbia also offers rebates of up to
$500 on residential electric car charging stations. Id. And, in January 2013, British Columbia
invested $1.3 million in 13 new direct current (DC) fast-charging stations throughout the
province to help electric vehicle owners charge their cars. David Karn, News Release: B.C.
plugging in to electric vehicle fast chargers, B.C., MINISTRY OF ENV’T 1 (Jan. 17, 2013),
http://www2.news.gov.bc.ca/news_releases_2009-2013/2013ENV0002-000067.pdf. The
cumulative effect of British Columbia’s combined public transportation, ride share, cycling,
guaranteed ride home program, LiveSmart on the Road program, and Clean Energy Point
of Sale Incentive Program is fewer individual fossil fuel burning commuters on the road,
thus fewer GHGs being released into the atmosphere. See id.; LiveSmart on the Road,
supra; Transportation Rebates and Incentives, supra.
405. See LiveSmart on the Road, supra note 404; see also Rodney L. Brown Jr.,
State-by-State or Regional Solutions?, ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND. (2015); see also WORLD
BANK, supra note 22, at 86.
406. Carbon Tax Act, S.B.C. 2008, P. 14, Schedule 1 (Can.).
407. Brian C. Murray & Nicholas Rivers, British Columbia’s Revenue-Neutral Carbon
Tax: A Review of the Latest “Grand Experiment” in Environmental Policy, NICHOLAS
INST., DUKE UNIV. 1 (May 2015), https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/publications/
ni_wp_15-04_full.pdf.
408. WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 79. These are considered the “trade-exposed”
sectors. The Effects of H.R. 2454 on International Competiveness and Emission Leakage
in Energy-Intensive Trade-Exposed Industries: An Interagency Report Responding to a
Request from Senators Bayh, Specter, Stabenow, McCaskill, and Brown, ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY 10 (Dec. 2, 2009), available at http://sallan.org/pdf-docs/EPAReport_Steelv Cement.pdf.
“Exported fuels and fuel consumption by aviation and shipping also travelling outside
British Columbia are not covered by the carbon tax. Non-combustion GHG emissions such
as industrial process emissions, venting and fugitive emissions are not covered either.”
WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 79. From 2014, “80% exemption to the carbon tax on
natural gas and propane for heating and CO2 production for green house growers, and
exemption for colored gasoline and colored diesel purchased by farmers.” WORLD BANK,
supra note 22, at 79.
409. Duff, Carbon Taxation in British Columbia, supra note 30, at 94.
410. Id. (“such as the production of oil, gas, aluminum, or cement”)
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of the implementation of a cap-and-trade system covering these industries,
but that initiative has failed.411 In addition, the tax also does not cover all
GHG gases, such as methane and nitrous oxide. 412 Thus, the tax is not
as comprehensive as it could be.
Second, the BC tax started at a low rate, varied depending upon the
carbon content of the fuel, and increased gradually over the years.413 This
gave consumers a warning of increased prices and certainty.414 It started
at a relative low rate of CAD $10 per ton of carbon dioxide equivalent
emissions and progressively increased each year by $5 until 2012, when
it reached the final and current price of CAD $30 per ton.415 In 2008, that
meant a 2.4 cents per liter increase in the price of gasoline and an increase
of 6.7 cents per liter by 2012.416 The problem here is that the rate is now
frozen and is not scheduled to increase further to reduce GHG emissions.
The BC government has said it might increase those rates if it does not meet
its emissions targets or if other jurisdictions pass similar carbon pricing
instruments.417
Third, the BC tax is simple, piggybacking on an existing fuel tax paid
mostly by wholesalers,418 (although natural gas was paid at the retail level).419
This upstream approach meant that the tax needs to be collected only from

411. Id. at 95, n.52; see also WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 86 (“The tax will be
integrated with other measures”).
412. Duff, supra note 30, at 94 (“from the disposal of solid waste and agricultural
sector”).
413. For an extensive analysis and charts of B.C.’s carbon tax shift, see Alan Durning
& Yoram Bauman, All You Need to Know About BC’s Carbon Tax Shift in Five Charts,
SIGHTLINE INST. (Mar. 11, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.sightline.org/2014/03/11/all-youneed-to-know-about-bcs-carbon-tax-shift-in-five-charts/.
414. Duff, Carbon Taxation in British Columbia, supra note 30, at 98; Clare Demerse,
Proof Positive: The Mechanics and Impacts of British Columbia’s Carbon Tax, CLEAN
ENERGY CAN. 2 , http://cleanenergycanada.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Carbon-TaxFact-Sheet.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2016) (“The tax started at $10 per metric ton of carbon
dioxide-equivalent in 2008 and ramped up by $5 each year to reach $30 a ton by 2012. In
2008, that meant a 2.4 cents per liter (US $.09/gallon) increase in the price of gasoline. By
2012, the tax increased gas prices by 6.7 cents per liter ($0.25/gallon).”).
415. Duff, Carbon Taxation in British Columbia, supra note 30, at 97. This tax
translated into roughly for $10—and C$7.23 per liter of gasoline. WORLD BANK, supra
note 22, at 79 (“CAN$30/tCO2e (US$28/tCO2e)”).
416. Demerse, supra note 414, at 2.
417. There are some problems here with such linkage. See discussion infra Part
IV.B.2.
418. Fuel wholesalers include fuel importers or domestic producers. Demerse, supra
note 414, at 3 (“Wholesalers pass the tax on to retailers, who pass it on to consumer—who
see it itemized on their receipts at the pump.”).
419. Id.; WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 86 (“carbon tax is applied and collected in
the same way that motor fuel taxes are currently applied and collected, except for natural
gas which is collected at the retail level”).
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a limited number of companies,420 and it did not require any additional
administration or enforcement resources.421 The tax is also transparent, as
consumers see it itemized on their receipts at the pump, or on their gas
bills.422
Fourth, the carbon tax was designed to be economically efficient, politically
feasible, and equitable. The tax was originally planned to have the “double
dividend” effect by being “revenue neutral,” meaning the revenues raised
were to be returned or recycled or shifted to business and individuals by
reducing other taxes.423 The tax has in fact been revenue negative.424
Although it raised about $880 million in 2010/2011, all revenues (and
more) are recycled back to taxpayers.425 In addition, when the tax was first
imposed, all residents got a $100 dividend or rebate check as a “sweetener”
to “reduce public opposition to the tax.”426 The tax also included a refundable
Climate Action Tax Credit for low-income households.427 Thus, the tax
was crafted to be politically palatable. But if these credits and rebates
were not enough, by law, the Minister of Finance is required to outline
how the revenues are to be recycled.428 If the revenue neutrality cannot
be ensured, the Minister’s salary will be cut 15%.429 Recent studies have
found that the BC tax “does not disadvantage low-income residents” and
is in fact “highly progressive, an effect enhanced by the provinces’ lowincome tax credits.”430

420. Demerse, supra note 414, at 3.
421. Id. at 2–3.
422. Id. at 3.
423. Duff, Carbon Taxation in British Columbia, supra note 30, at 96–100. This is
in contrast to Québec, where revenues go to a Green Fund to support climate change initiative.
Id. at 96–97.
424. Mori, supra note 216, at 18–19.
425. Duff, Carbon Taxation in British Columbia, supra note 30, at 98–99; see also
Mori, supra note 216, at 16–19.
426. Duff, Carbon Taxation in British Columbia, supra note 30, at 99.
427. Id. at 99.
428. WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 86
429. Id.
430. Demerse, supra note 414, at 6. It is also possible that consumers can substitute
public transportation for cars and thus reduce the regressive impact of the tax. Id. Tax on
certain fuels, however, might not be inelastic, meaning the consumer might be able to
substitute another energy form. Id.
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In 2012, British Columbia conducted a five-year review of its carbon
tax.431 Their economic analysis showed it had only a small impact on the
economy and that the province continued to grow well compared to other
Canadian provinces.432 Furthermore, statistics showed that the tax had reduced
emissions by making carbon-intensive activities more expensive. 433
Consumption of petroleum products declined by 19%434 compared to an
increase of 3% in the rest of Canada.435
The public has generally supported the BC tax.436 Polls have shown that a
majority of British Columbians supported the tax at its inception and a
majority continue to support it today.437 In the 2009 election the governing
party’s opposition ran on an “Axe the Tax” campaign to kill the carbon
tax, but lost the election and later dropped their opposition to the tax.438
Even the business community has been “mildly supportive” of the tax.439
When interest groups complained after the 2012 review, the government
made several concessions through grants and exemptions.440 Thus, it seems
the BC tax is flexible in its implementation, integral to BC fiscal policy,
and likely to remain in place.441
However, this tax alone is not enough to effect significant climate change.
The BC legislature specifically designed the carbon tax to be integrated
with other measures, such as cap-and-trade programs.442 Because the carbon
tax rate is frozen and the tax does not cover those industries that would
have been subject to a cap-and-trade, BC should sign on to the California
and Québec Cap-and-Trade system.443 They could also link up with the Alberta

431. Marlo Lewis, Is British Columbia’s Carbon Tax a Model for the U.S.?,
GLOBALWARMING.ORG (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.globalwarming.org/2014/08/07/is-britishcolumbias-carbon-tax-a-model-for-the-u-s/.
432. Id.
433. Mori, supra note 216, at 18
434. WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 87.
435. Stewart Elgie, British Columbia’s carbon tax shift: An environmental and
economic success, WORLD BANK BLOGS (Sept. 10, 2014), http://blogs.worldbank.org/climate
change/british-columbia-s-carbon-tax-shift-environmental-and-economic-success.
436. WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 87.
437. Demerse, supra note 414, at 4 (“Polling shows that a majority of British
Columbians (54 percent) supported the tax when it was introduced, and a majority (52 percent)
continue to support it today. In 2012, public support for the tax reached a high of 64 percent
just as the tax reached its maximum level.”). Businesses were “cautiously accepting” of
the carbon tax when it was first introduced. Id.
438. Id.
439. WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 87.
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. Id. at 86.
443. Duff, supra note 30, at 94; see also WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 86.
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system.444 In the alternative, the BC carbon tax base should be expanded
and the rates increased.
b. Boulder’s Carbon Tax
One city that has successfully implemented a carbon tax is Boulder,
Colorado. The carbon tax in Boulder was implemented in 2012 and will
expire in 2018.445 Boulder’s carbon tax, which is officially called the
Climate Action Plan Excise Tax, charges very low rates of $0.0049 per
kWh for residential, $0.0009 per kWh for commercial, and $0.0003 per
kWh for industrial consumers.446 Boulder effectuates this tax by stating
directly in the City Code, § 3-12-1 that “the City Council determines and
declares that the consumption of electricity within the City is the exercise
of a taxable privilege.”447 Revenues are to be reinvested in environmental
initiatives.448 Thus, Boulder’s implementation of the Climate Action Plan
Excise Tax demonstrates that a city can declare energy usage within its
jurisdictional boundaries to be a privilege that can be subject to taxation.
Furthermore, by taxing centralized power consumption, cities can reinvest
that money in policies that provide tax incentives for consumers who invest
in localized power sources or green buildings that require less power to
operate. Therefore, instituting a carbon tax can be the first step in creating
a sustainable, GHG reduction plan for many cities.449

444. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
445. Boulder Climate Action Plan Excise Tax, BOULDER, COLO. REV. CODE §§ 3-121, 3-12-2 (2012).
446. Neha Bhatt & Michael Ryan, Carbon Energy Tax, SMALL GROWTH AM. 1, http://
www.smartgrowthamerica.org/documents/Boulder-Carbon-Tax.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2016).
447. COLO. REV. CODE § 3-12-1.
448. Id.
449. Boulder is also proposing a 2.16 cents per KWh charge for cannabis growers.
See Jan Lee, Boulder County Proposes Cannabis Carbon “Tax,” TRIPLE PUNDIT (Nov. 25,
2014), http://www.triplepundit.com/2014/11/boulder-county-imposes-cannabis-carbon-tax
(“According to one industry source, it takes about 5,000 kilowatt hours of electricity to
grow about 2.2 pounds of good-quality pot.”). It is not yet clear how the tax will be used, but
pesticide pollution and carbon dioxide levels are problems related to marijuana growing.
Id.
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c. San Francisco’s Carbon Tax
In 2008, San Francisco approved a carbon tax.450 Pursuant to this tax,
more than 2,500 businesses were required to pay a low rate of 4.4 cents
per ton for the carbon dioxide they emitted.451 Despite the relatively low
tax rate, about seven power plants and oil refineries had to pay more than
$50,000.452 These fees are expected to generate $1.1 million in the first
year, which will be used to pay for emissions-reduction programs around
the city.453
Policy analysts say the relatively small fee probably will not cause business
to change their practices or incentivize new clean technologies.454 However,
these programs have already brought remarkable gains in climate change
mitigation. By 2010, the programs contributed to a reduction in carbon
emissions by 12% below the 1990 levels.455 Specifically, in 2010, San
Francisco’s citywide carbon footprint totaled 5.4 million metric tons of
carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e), down from 6.2 million metric tons in
1990.456 This reduction translates to taking roughly 128,000 cars off the
road, or avoiding burning 1.5 million barrels of oil per year.457 These
tremendous reductions have exceeded emission reduction goals set forth
by both the United Nations at the Kyoto Protocol, which called for emissions
reductions of 7% by 2012.458 Furthermore, San Francisco’s impressive
reduction in CO2 was achieved despite a growth in the City’s population.459
In addition, all the revenues from the carbon tax are to be reinvested in
green programs.460 Thus, the tax has set a precedent and raises significant
revenue that can be reinvested in additional green initiatives that can help
prevent climate change.
The Bay Area Air Quality Management District’s board of directors voted
15-1 in favor of the tax. 461 Thus, San Francisco has demonstrated that
government policy makers do not have to wait for federal and state mandates
before taking action. Cities can pursue grass-roots local-initiative that exceed

450. San Francisco Approves Carbon Tax, SUSTAINABLEBUSINESS.COM (May 22, 2008,
7:50 AM), http://www.sustainablebusiness.com/index.cfm/go/news.display/id/16079.
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. San Francisco’s Leadership in Carbon Emission Reduction, THE GLOBAL COMPACT
CITIES PROGRAMME, http://citiesprogramme.com/archives/1426 (last visited Jan. 3, 2016).
456. Id.
457. Id.
458. Id.
459. Id.
460. SUSTAINABLEBUSINESS.COM, supra note 450.
461. Id.
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the expectations of the larger governmental bodies and achieve exceptional
results by implementing minimally intrusive carbon taxes.
3. Oregon and Washington’s Proposed Carbon Taxes
In 2009, the Oregon Legislature considered a cap-and-trade program, but
the bill did not make it out of committee.462 Then, in 2014, the Legislature
proposed a carbon tax which would have taxed fuel suppliers (coal, natural
gas and petroleum products) and utilities (on electricity). Exemptions were
provided for fuels transported out of state and not used in the state and for
fuels used in interstate commerce, such as maritime and aviation fuel.463
The funds from the tax were to fund tax credits that would reduce personal
income and corporate excise tax. In addition, a part of the funds were to
be used for the “construction or installation of alternative energy systems”
and for “implementation of systems or programs that result in the reduction
of the use of carbon fuels.”464 The tax was expected to start at $10/metric
ton and increase until $60/metric ton by 2015.465
The legislature commissioned the Northwest Economic Research Center
at Portland State to study various combinations of tax rates and revenue
uses.466 The study used various carbon prices (up to $60/ton) with reinvestment
into energy efficiency programs of 10% and 25%. The study concluded that
a “BC-style carbon tax and shift could generate significant amount of revenue
and reduce tax distortions while raising new jobs and reducing carbon
emission.”467 Despite these favorable findings, the tax was never passed.
A similar scenario happened in Washington State where Governor Jay
Inslee proposed a carbon tax plan468 and Washington State Senator Kevin
Ranker (D-Orcas Island) introduced a bill into Washington legislature
462. Christina Williams, Oregon Steps Back from Western Climate Initiative, PORTLAND
BUS. J. (June 20, 2014, 5:57 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/portland/blog/sbo/2011/11/
oregon-steps-back-from-western-climate.html.
463. H.B. 2082, 78th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2015).
464. Id.
465. LIU & RENFRO, supra note 140, at 16 (“With a tax starting in 2013 with a $60
maximum and $10 annual increase, in 2015 emissions would be 2% below the baseline
forecast. . .”).
466. Alan Durning & Yoram Bauman, Will Oregon Cook Up a Carbon Tax?, SIGHTLINE
INST. (Apr. 1, 2014, 6:35 AM), http://www.sightline.org/2014/04/01/will-oregon-cookup-a-carbon-tax/.
467. Id.
468. John Stang, Turbulence ahead for Inslee’s climate plan, CROSSCUT.COM (Jan.
16, 2015), http://crosscut.com/2015/01/supporters-push-inslees-climate-plan-legislative-a/.

123

SHURTZ(ADA) (DO NOT DELETE)

9/29/2016 10:31 AM

creating a carbon tax system similar to the one in British Columbia. 469
The tax was to be on fossil fuels as well as on the carbon content in electricity
consumed within the state. The tax rate was $15 per metric ton of carbon
dioxide and increase to $25 by July 1, 2018, with automatic increases
thereafter by 3 1/5 % plus inflation.470 All the revenue would go to the
general budget, but unlike BC, there is no income tax in Washington. Thus,
the general sales tax could be reduced. Like Oregon, the Washingt on
legislature requested a study be done to assess the economic and equitable
consequences.471 The study concluded, as did the Oregon economic study,
that a tax system similar to British Columbia could be effective to help
carbon emissions while maintaining a balance between economic growth
and equity to low-income energy consumers.472 As of this writing, nothing
has been passed, or is likely to pass in Washington or in Oregon.
IV. ASSESSMENT AND CHALLENGES TO REFORM
Overall, my study of carbon tax and cap-and-trade initiatives results in
the following conclusions:
1. The number of world-wide carbon initiatives is disappointing.
2. Cap-and-trade seems to be the dominant system world-wide,
rather than carbon taxation.
3. Many of the countries taking action are the richer countries
that have benefited from GHG emissions in the past.
4. Many cities, states, and regions propose climate change initiatives
that are never implemented.
5. Because of economic, business, and political concerns, many
carbon initiatives are not that effective.
6. These initiatives can only work with community support and
political leadership.
7. Market mechanisms will work best with mandates and other
environmental policies to effectively combat climate change.
8. North America should link and expand all cap-and-trade
systems throughout the region (and world) and local states
and cities should pass carbon taxes (while additional
environmental initiatives should be implemented).

469. Cassandra Profita, A Carbon Tax In Oregon?, OR. PUB. BROAD. (Jan. 8, 2013),
http://www.opb.org/news/blog/ecotrope/a-carbon-tax-in-oregon/.
470. Initiative Measure No. 732, OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y OF STATE, WASH. 5 (Mar. 20,
2015), http://sos.wa.gov/_assets/elections/initiatives/FinalText_779.pdf.
471. Keibun Mori, Washington State Carbon Tax, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF COMMERCE 1
(July 2011), http://www.commerce.wa.gov/Documents/Washington-State-Carbon-Tax.pdf.
472. Id. at 44–47.
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The challenges to a North American comprehensive global warming
regional and carbon pricing initiative are many. First, constitutional issues
arise as to whether these state and regional plans violate the interstate
commerce or other constitutional doctrines. Second, design issues arise as
to how different cap-and-trade regimes can work together and alongside
carbon taxes. Third, political issues arise as to whether cities, states and
regions have the will to pass these measures. What is clear is that ethically
North America should move forward with these initiatives on a city, state
and regional level.
A. Constitutional Hurdles
Most local/regional tax and cap-and-trade programs in the U.S. are not
going to violate the Commerce Clause or the EPA’s authority under the
Clean Air Act if they are crafted appropriately. Under the standards established
by the courts, if the state regulates “even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest” affecting interstate commerce in an insignificant manner,
it “will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such comer is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”473 State regulations
that impact some interstate commerce but that do not discriminate against
interstate commerce will be upheld.474
Usually, the carbon system will exempt aviation and maritime activities
in interstate commerce, exempt exports and only tax imports. This is done
so the businesses within the state can compete fairly with businesses bringing
their products into the state. However, care must be taken to craft the carbon
system appropriately.
A recent Ninth Circuit case,475 challenging the California Air Resources
Board’s (CARB) Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) under the Commerce
Clause illustrates this issue. The challengers were arguing that LCFS
discriminated against ethanol producers from out-of-state. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals remanded stating that the LCFS did not “facially
discriminate against out-of-state commerce” but calling on the lower court
to determine if LCFS discriminated in purpose or effect against out-ofstate commerce. On remand the court granted defendants motion for
summary judgment stating that LCFS in fact facially discriminated.

473.
474.
475.

Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 126 (1978).
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013).
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Many law reviews have been written on this topic, so it is beyond the
scope of this paper to delve deeply into this issue. 476 However, both
Washington and Oregon governors are contemplating executive orders to
implement a LCFS in their respective states.477 Thus, if constitutional
issues do impose obstacles, then state and city initiatives must be designed
to alleviate those issues.
As for the issue of whether the EPA Clean Air Act (CAA) preempts
state cap-and-trade and carbon tax proposals, consensus of commentator
is that it does not.478 The EPA recently took steps to encourage states to
use cap-and-trade programs and in its regulations encouraged additional
linkage opportunities.479 Furthermore, EPA officials reported in the New
York Times that states could comply with the act by “enacting state-level
carbon tax on carbon pollution.”480 Thus, experts conclude: “EPA’s proposed
regulations pursuant to section 111d of the CAA recognize the legitimacy
of regional cap-and-trade programs and Congress is unlikely to develop a
comprehensive cap-and-trade law, state-administered cap-and-trade programs
linked with foreign governments do not conflict with the federal foreign
affairs power.”481
B. Design Issues
In addition to making the carbon and cap-and-trade systems consistent
with interstate commerce and international trade rules, the cap-and-trade
and carbon tax systems themselves must be designed to be effective with
broad coverage, reasonable allocation of permits, tight caps or rates (with

476. See, e.g., Kathryn Abbott, The Dormant Commerce Clause and California’s
Low Carbon Fuel Standard, 3 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 179 (2013); Ross Astoria, The
Export Clause and the Constitutionality of a National Cap and Trade CO 2 Mitigation
Policy, 26 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 117 (2014).
477. Stegman, supra note 402, at 235.
478. Chandiok, supra note 273, at 278; Karen Edson, California Independent System
Operator, Presentation at the Seventh Annual San Diego Climate and Energy Law Symposium
(Nov. 6, 2015); Amy Stein, University of Florida Levin College of Law, Presentation at
the Seventh Annual San Diego Climate and Energy Law Symposium (Nov. 6, 2015); Kevin
Poloncarz, Paul Hastings LLP, Presentation at the Seventh Annual San Diego Climate and
Energy Law Symposium (Nov. 6, 2015).
479. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830, 34,832 (Envtl. Prot. Agency June 18, 2014)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. 60.5700), at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-06-18/pdf/
2014-13726.pdf.
480. Davenport, supra note 226; see also Samuel D. Eisenberg et al., A State Tax
Approach to Regulating Greenhouse Gases Under the Clean Air Act, THE BROOKINGS INST.
(May 22, 2014), http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/05/22-state-tax-regulatinggreenhouse-gas-clean-air-act-morris.
481. Stegman, supra note 402, at 238.
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incremental phase-ins), and limited exemptions.482 These systems must
also be coordinated with other exiting tax and fee structures within the
jurisdiction. In addition, any cap-and-trade regime should be coordinated
with any carbon tax within that same region. Lastly, if a cap-and-trade
system within one jurisdiction is to be linked to another cap-and-trade system
in another jurisdiction, then their design must be effectively integrated.
1. Coordination Issues
Any carbon tax or cap-and-trade fee must be coordinated with each
other and with other existing taxes and fees within the city, state or region.
Most jurisdictions have sales, consumption or VAT taxes, pollution taxes,
or gas and motor fuel fees. Often these overlapping taxes are common
and acceptable.483 But to reduce any negative effects on the economy and
the competitiveness of the industry groups in the region, all taxing and fee
systems must be analyzed to assess the risks from this harmful double
taxation on business.484 Exemptions and reduced rates may be one way to
handle this issue. For example, the Scandinavian countries that are part of
the EU illustrate this approach through exemptions, discounts and phasein rules.485 Some countries, like Finland, just exempt all electricity covered
by EU ETS, while other countries, like Sweden and Denmark have limited
exemptions, discounts and phase-ins.
Any adverse impact on the consumer from these double taxes and fees
should also be assessed. When low-income taxpayers are faced with unfair
burdens because of the inelasticity of the energy source, the government
needs to be creative and come up with other mechanisms or programs to
solve these issues. For example, the CA Cap-and-Trade system is a fee
where all the funds have to go into a green fund. In order to make the
overall system fair to low-income taxpayers, the state required the utility
companies to give rebates.486 Also much of the money is to go into alternative
transportation systems that could benefit the low-income citizen.
482. See CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, supra note 222; see Shurtz, supra note 10.
483. See Duff, supra note 9 (discussing automotive fuel taxes, motor vehicle taxes,
etc., as well as fertilizer taxes and sulfur taxes).
484. See Deng, supra note 167, at 670 (“Above all, the integration of a carbon tax
into the current tax system will achieve self-consistency and double dividend effects. In
other words, the seamless implementation of a carbon tax into the current tax system is as
important as devising a good tax plan.”).
485. See sources cited supra notes 94–137.
486. See discussion supra Part III.A.3.
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For the same reasons, it makes sense to coordinate a carbon tax and capand-trade system in the same region. A cap-in-trade in one region could
also be coordinated with a carbon tax in another jurisdiction. Some have
stated that linking these systems “would be relatively easy, as the price in
each is explicit.”487 For example, a business in a carbon tax country could
purchase a permit in the country with a cap-and trade, and then remit it in
lieu of making a tax payment in their country. Conversely, a business in
a cap-and-trade could remit carbon tax payments to its government in
excess of its emissions and receive emissions-tax-payment credits for the
excess tax payment which could be sold to firms in the country with a capand-trade and which that country could use in place of permits.
2. Linkage Issues
As we mentioned earlier California and Québec have effectively linked
their cap-and trade system. Both systems accept allowances from either
regime to cover the businesses’ emissions.488 EU has bilaterally linked with
New Zealand and with Australia and uses Kyoto credits interchangeably.
Canada and the United States, and other countries that did not sign on to the
Kyoto Protocol, “are not able to offer participants the option of submitting
Kyoto units in place of domestic allocation.”489
Allocation differences can cause competitive disadvantages if they have
two different allocation methods. If one system auctions the majority of
allowances, like the RGGI, and the other, like the EU EST, gives them out
free, then the cost to the participant in the RGGI would be higher and would
hurt their business as the consumer would have to pay a higher price for
their product. Although these systems do not compete, this illustrates the
potential problem of linkage of two systems in one region. Similar competitive
problems arise when the two systems do not cover the same sectors.
Again, the sector covered by the tax or cap-and-trade would have a higher
cost and be more expensive to its consumers, causing them to shift to the
lower priced competitor. A similar inequity might occur if the systems
have different monitoring or enforcement mechanisms. In addition, a system
with lower caps will result in a participant benefiting from having more
allowances to cover their emissions that will give them a competitive
advantage.

487.
488.
489.
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3. Coordination with Other Policies
To become effective in significant GHG emissions, not only cap-and-trade
and carbon taxes need to be passed, but other policies must be adopted.490
Sweden and Denmark illustrate this comprehensive approach as these
countries uses carbon taxes, in addition to gas taxes and other fees and taxes.
For example, Sweden has a fertilizer tax and Denmark has a sulfur tax. These
countries also use tax incentives and other green environmental initiatives.
In North America, such a comprehensive approach is needed.491
C. Political/Ethical Hurdles
In order for effective community and local tax initiatives to occur and
succeed, several things need to happen. First, the citizens must be connected
to their community and its needs. Second, local government must be willing
to rid itself of its economic growth mindset—giving tax incentives for
negative economic behavior. Third, an integrated plan must be developed,
implemented, and monitored. Environmental taxes combined with capand-trade and other nontax policies provide the best approach, as illustrated
by the Western North America initiatives.
We in North America have an ethical responsibility to act. First, we are
not immune from the effects of global warming. Those in the western U.S.
have experienced droughts. Those in the south and east have experienced
severe storms. Rising sea levels will impact Florida, New York City, and
many other coastal communities. In the U.S. millions of people depend on
winter snowfall to fill rivers and supply water.492 Hopefully, our concern
490. See WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 93–94.
491. California has passed Senate Bill 375, “which requires the state’s Metropolitan
Planning Organizations to include as part of their long-range transportation plans a ‘sustainable
community’s strategy’ that is designed to meet greenhouse gas reduction targets set by the
state Air Resources Board.” Keith Bartholomew, Cities and Accessibility: The Potential
for Carbon Reductions and the Need for National Leadership, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 159,
209 (2009) (citing 2008 Cal. Adv. Leg. Serv. 728).
492. Paul Kitagaki Jr., As snowpack deepens, drought concern lingers, ORANGE
CNTY. REGISTER (Jan. 25, 2016 1:59 PM), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/snowpack701151-water-california.html; see Anthony Watts, Drought buster? Up to 10 Feet of Snow
this Week for California’s Sierra Nevada, W ATTS U P WITH THAT ? (Jan. 4, 2016),
https://wattsupwiththat.com/2016/01/04/drought-buster-up-to-10-feet-of-snow-this-week-forcalifornias-sierra-nevada/; see also Dennis Dimick, Lack Of Snow Leaves California’s
‘Water Tower’ Running Low, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC (Mar. 24, 2015, 11:48 PM), http://
news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2015/03/150304-snow-snowpack-california-droughtgroundwater-crisis/.
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of the impact of global warming on future generations will push us into a
leadership role.
Second, the U.S. and Canada have been (and still are) some of the biggest
consumers of carbon.493 The U.S. is the second largest contributor to climate
change.494 Thus, based on this past and present usage in North America,
we have the ethical duty to act. If all the states and provinces in North
America signed on to a regional cap-and-trade and carbon tax program, they
could together, reduce global emissions by one-third.495
Third, Canada and the U.S. are going to be two of the biggest beneficiaries
of the melting ice at the North Pole. The five nations with Arctic frontage
—Canada, Denmark, Norway Russia and the United States—will be the
winners.496 In addition, many businesses will reap huge profits from this
tragedy.497 Many of these companies are from the U.S. and Canada.498
The countries that will be hit the hardest from global warming are mostly
tropical and poor. For example, Bangladesh is second on the Climate Change
Vulnerability Index,499 yet the average person there emits 0.3 tons of carbon
a year. This is one seventieth of the average American rate.500 Other losers
include the Maldives, Tuvalu, Kiribati, Seychelles, Bahamas and the
Carteret.501 Cities, such as “Manila, Alexandria, Lagos, Karachi, Kolkata,
Jakarta, Dakar, Rio, Miami, and Ho Chi Minh City, are probably doomed.”502
According to estimates, by “2050, a billion people would be pushed from
their homes by global warming.”503 Already, large segments of these societies
are struggling to relocate. Under New Zealand immigration quotas, “[s]eventyfive Tuvaluans and seventy-five Kiribatians” are able to relocate each
year.504 The “first five of seventeen hundred Carteret Islanders moved to
newly purchased land in Bougainville.505 Ironically, these countries were
the least responsible for the consumption of the fuels that produced the

493. See Johannes Friedrich et al., Top 10 Greenhouse Gas Emitters: Find Out Which
Countries Are Most Responsible for Climate Change, EcoWatch (June 24, 2015, 10:42
AM), http://ecowatch.com/2015/06/24/greenhouse-gas-climate-change/.
494. Id. China is the largest emitter of greenhouse gases. Id.
495. Stegman, supra note 402, at 243.
496. See FUNK, supra note 9.
497. Id. at 4.
498. See id. at 9.
499. Id. at 205.
500. Id. at 199.
501. Id. at 64.
502. Id.
503. Id. at 65.
504. Id.
505. Id. at 65.
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emissions that caused the global warming.506 And they will be the least
able to afford the technology to adapt to it.
Climate change is most likely to be “different for those who can afford
to adapt.”507 The rich countries will be able to afford “the desalination plants,
the seawalls,” artificial islands floating beaches, etc.508 These countries,
their companies, and wealthy citizens will most likely be the beneficiaries
of technology advancement. The wealthy will “be the first to afford them,
those who are emitting the most carbon, who are taking care of themselves
before turning to the developing world.”509 Even geoengineering can result
in winners and losers and that technology in the hands of the richer nations.510
“A blueprint for disaster in any society is when the elite are capable of
insulating themselves.”511
Policies that have been proven to be effective in one community should
be just as effective in another community on the other side of the country
or world. While these goals might present tall orders for many localities
around the world, North American initiatives demonstrate that with a little
creativity and innovation, sustainable and effective environmental policies
can be created. It may be difficult to translate what has happened in developed
North America to rural areas and to the undeveloped world. It may be even
harder to translate these local policies into effective federal or international
policies.512 Without action at the U.S. federal level, however, local jurisdictions
may not be able to effectively impact agricultural policies, forestry policies,
506. Frontline states, such as Spain, Italy, Malta and Greece are policing the border
of all of Europe—people from Africa and Syria, etc. Id. at 173.
507. Id. at 223.
508. Id. at 10.
509. Id. at 82.
510. Id. at 279–80.
511. Id. at 188.
512. One way that local governments can advocate for change outside their jurisdictional
boundaries, however, is through their purchasing power in the international community.
Take for example, San Francisco and the passage of Ordinance 88-04 that prohibits the
use of rainforest lumber in new city projects. Tropical Hardwood and Virgin Redwood
Ban, S.F. ENVTL. CODE, ch. 8 (2001), http://library.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/California/
administrative/administrativecode?f=templates$fn=default.htm$3.0$vid=amlegal:sanfran
cisco_ca$sync=1. By passing ordinances such as 88-04, cities can reduce the degradation
of rainforests thousands of miles away. However, that does not mean that local governments
cannot work with countries that supply lumber from rainforests. Local governments can
push foreign countries to replant the forests that they clear-cut and engage in sustainable
forestry processes. Local governments can do so by pledging to buy sustainable lumber
or other sustainably harvested goods in exchange for a pledge that the country follows
sustainable environmental practices.
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natural resource extraction and other issues outside their boundaries.513
Therefore, for large-scale issues to be addressed, the U.S. federal government
is the only entity with jurisdiction to make a positive change.514 Thus, the
federal government should play a larger role in engaging local policymakers
to foster local climate change efforts.515 Perhaps these North American
initiatives can send a clear and consistent message to the federal government
and to other countries of the world.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has compared carbon taxes with cap-and-trade and highlighted
the successes of these programs in Western North America. It has advocated
a comprehensive climate change plan to regionally link all cap-and-trade
systems while passing local carbon taxes. Although programs at the state,
local, and regional levels are critical for providing creative solutions to
the climate change crisis, what is needed is a binding U.S. federal and
international response. Nonetheless, local governments should continue
to pass innovative market initiatives, combining both a cap-and-trade with
a carbon tax, along with other environmental policies to help stop widespread
and potentially disastrous climate change.

513. Id.
514. One promising development is the carbon tariffs proposed against the exports
of countries that refuse to join the international efforts to limit COS emissions. See Paul
Krugman, Opinion, China, Coal, Climate, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/11/14/opinion/paul-krugman-china-coal-climate.html (“Such tariffs probably wouldn’t
even require any change in existing trade law, and they would provide a powerful incentive
for handouts to get with the program.”).
515. See Thomas M. Gremillion, Setting The Foundation: Climate Change Adaptation
At the Local Level, 41 ENVTL. L. 1221, 1251–53 (2011). One way the federal government
could be effective at promoting more local climate change tax policies is by creating a
national adaptation fund. Id. at 1252. A national adaptation fund could award grants for
local projects to better integrate transportation, land use and natural resource planning. Id.
Additionally, such a fund could help local governments phase-out antiquated travel demand
models and make realistic assessments of how planned development will affect the local
water supply and air shed as the climate changes. Id. National adaptation funds could help
in areas where there is local opposition, such as revising zoning codes to relax requirements
such as parking setbacks. Id. at 1252–53. Such reforms are often difficult for local policymakers
to undertake because of local opposition. Id. at 1253. The enticement of federal funding
could matter here and perhaps the prospect of creating jobs could also win support from
local partners. Id. By creating a national adaptation fund, the federal government could
finally make a meaningful contribution to the omnipresent need to halt climate change. Id.
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APPENDIX A
CHART 1: EASTERN HEMISPHERE CARBON TAX POLICIES
COUNTRY/
JURISDICTION

START
DATE

TAX RATE
($USD
UNLESS
NOTED
OTHERWISE)
$48/metric ton
CO2

ANNUAL
REVENUE

REVENUE
DISTRIBUTION

$750 million
(500 million
euros)

government budget;
accompanied by
independent cuts in
income taxes
reductions in other
taxes; climate
mitigation
programs
government budget

FINLAND516

1990

NETHERLANDS517

1990

~$20/metric
ton CO2 in
1996

$4.819
billion (3.213
billion euros)

NORWAY518

1991

$33/metric ton
CO2

SWEDEN519

1991

$168/metric
ton of CO2

DENMARK520

1992

$31/metric ton
CO2

$900 million
(1994
estimate)
$3.665
billion (25
billion SEK)
$905 million

UNITED
KINGDOM521

2013

$15.75/metric
ton of CO2

FRANCE522

2014

$10/metric ton
of CO2 (12
euros)
increasing to

$1.191
billion (714
million
pounds)
$4.499
billion (3
billion euros)

government budget
environmental
subsidies and
returned to industry
reductions in other
taxes
reductions in other
taxes

516.
517.

WORLD BANK 2, supra note 143, at 2.
JENNY SUMMER ET AL., Nat’l Renewable Energy Laboratory, CARBON TAXES: A
REVIEW OF EXPERIENCE AND POLICY DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS, at v (2009), http://www.nrel.gov/
docs/fy10osti/47312.pdf.
518. Annegrete Bruvollo & Bodil Larsen, Greenhouse gas emissions in Norway: Do
carbon taxes work?, STATISTICS NOR., RESEARCH DEP’T (Dec. 2002), http://www.ssb.no/
a/publikasjoner/pdf/DP/dp337.pdf.
519. WORLD BANK 2, supra note 143, at 3; see also Energy Policies of IEA Countries:
Sweden, 2008 Review, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY (2008), http://www.iea.org/publications/free
publications/publication/Sweden2008.pdf.
520. WORLD BANK 2, supra note 143, at 2.
521. Id. at 4.
522. Id. at 2.
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IRELAND523

2010

ICELAND524

2010

SWITZERLAND525

2008

PORTUGAL526

2014

SOUTH
AFRICA527
JAPAN528

Proposed
2017
2012

AUSTRALIA529

2012;
repealed
2014

9/29/2016 10:31 AM

22 euros in
2016
$28/metric
CO2 (20
euros)
$10/metric ton
of CO2
$68/metric ton
CO2
$5/metric of
CO2
$30/metric ton
of CO2
$3.7/metric
ton of CO2
$19.60/metric
ton CO2
(A$23)

$448 million
(400 million
euros)

reduction on taxes
paid to treasury

$22.92
billion
$178 million

$2.2 billion

subsidies to
families with
children
tax reductions in
sustainable policies
and practices
reduce national
welfare
mitigate climate
change

523. Finance Act 2010, (S.I. No. 115/2011) (Ir.), available at http://www.irishstatute
book.ie/eli/2010/act/5/enacted/en/html; see also Carbon Pricing as of 2014, SIGHTLINE
INST. (Nov. 17, 2014), http://sightline.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/
global-carbon-programs-map-still-111714.png.
524. WORLD BANK 2, supra note 143, at 2.
525. Id. at 3–4; see also Neil Maclucas, Swiss Voters Reject Initiative to Replace
VAT System With Carbon Tax, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 8, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/swissvoters-reject-initiative-to-replace-vat-system-with-carbon-tax-1425822327.
526. WORLD BANK 2, supra note 143, at 3; see also Portugal sees Crisis as Opportunity
for Green Tax Reform, WWF.GR (Sept. 26, 2014), http://www.wwf.gr/crisis-watch/crisiswatch/economy-development/11-economy-development/portugal-sees-crisis-as-opportunityfor-green-tax-reform.
527. WORLD BANK 2, supra note 143, at 3; South Africa Gears Up for Carbon Tax,
PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (Aug. 16, 2010), http://en.people.cn/90001/90777/90855/7106312.
html; see also Theresa Alton et al., Introducing Carbon Taxes In South Africa 116 APPLIED
ENERGY 344, 348 (2014), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
S0306261913009288; How Will the Draft Carbon Tax Bill Affect You?, THE CARBON
REPORT, http://www.thecarbonreport.co.za/the-proposed-south-african-carbon-tax/ (last
visited May 10, 2016).
528. WORLD BANK 2, supra note 143, at 2–3; MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT JAPAN,
DETAILS ON THE CARBON TAX 2, https://www.env.go.jp/en/policy/tax/env-tax/20121001a_dct.
pdf (last visited May 10, 2016).
529. Peter Hannam, Carbon price helped curb emissions, ANU study finds, GUARDIAN
(July 17, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com.au/story/2423463/carbon-price-helped-curbemissions-anu-study-finds/?cs=8.
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CHART 2: WESTERN HEMISPHERE CARBON TAX POLICIES
COUNTRY/
JURISDICTION

START
DATE

BOULDER, CO530

2007

QUÉBEC531

2007

$13/metric
CO2

BRITISH
COLUMBIA532

2008

ALBERTA533

2007

$28.64/metric
ton CO2
(C$30)
$15/metric ton
CO2
$5/metric ton
CO2

$191
million
(C$200
million)
$1 billion
(C$306
million)
$300
million
$10-15
million

$15/metric ton
of CO2

expected
$1.7 billion

MARYLAND534

2010;
repealed
2012

WASHINGTON535

proposed

TAX RATE
($USD
UNLESS
NOTED
OTHERWISE)
$7/metric ton
CO2

ANNUAL
REVENUE

$1 million

REVENUE
DISTRIBUTION

climate
mitigation
programs
climate
mitigation
programs
reductions in
other taxes
technologyfund
residential
energy
efficiency
upgrades
offset state
sales tax and

530. Id.
531. Id.
532. Id.
533. Id.; see also Carbon Tax Proposal a Non-starter in Alberta, CBCNEWS (Jan. 8,
2008, 10:41 AM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/carbon-tax-proposal-a-nonstarter-in-alberta-1.722194. This is not a true carbon tax but rather a performance regulation on
businesses. See Mark Jaccard, Alberta’s (Non)-Carbon Tax and Our Threatened Climate,
SUSTAINABILITY SUSPICIONS (Apr. 26, 2013), http://markjaccard.blogspot.com/2013/04/
albertas-non-carbon-tax-and-our.html. Alberta has a true carbon tax proposed to start in
2017. See Jodie Sinnema, New Alberta Climate-change Plan Includes Carbon Tax For
Individual Albertans, Cap on Oils and Emissions, EDMONTON J. (Nov. 23, 2015), http://
edmontonjournal.com/news/local-news/new-alberta-climate-change-plan-includes-carbontax-for-individual-albertans-cap-on-oilsands-emissions.
534. Adverse Economic Impacts of a Carbon Tax in Maryland, NAT’L ASS’N OF MFRS.,
http://www.nam.org/Issues/Tax-and-Budget/Carbon-Tax/State-Sheets/Maryland/ (last visited
May 10, 2016); see also Sonal Patel, Gas Taxes: Carbon Taxes Around the World, POWER
(Dec. 27, 2011), http://www.powermag.com/gas-taxes-carbon-taxes-around-the-world/?
printmode=1.
535. Our Policy, CARBON WASH., http://yeson732.org/plain-language/ (last visited May
10, 2016) (“This tax swap will take place over two years, with the sales tax reduction divided
in two (a half-percentage-point reduction in each year) and the carbon tax phasing in from
$15 per ton in the first year to $25 per ton in the second year and then increasing thereafter
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2016

$10/metric ton
of CO2

Proposed

$40/metric ton
of CO2

SAN FRANCISCO,
CA (BAAQMD)538

2008

$1.1
million

COSTA RICA539

1997

$0.045/metric
ton of CO2 (on
businesses
only)
$1-14/metric
ton of CO2

CHILE540

2018

MEXICO541

2014

$5/metric ton
CO2
$3/metric ton
of CO2

$160
million
$1 billion

NEW YORK537

generate
$2.1-2.2
billion each
year

$15 million

fund Working
Families Rebate
generate $2.12.2 billion each
year
60% goes to
low income
households, the
rest goes to
climate change
programs; 40%
for supporting
the transition to
clean energy in
the State
climate change
programs
climate
mitigation
programs

at 3.5% plus inflation (up to a maximum of $100 in 2016 dollars) in order to maintain
revenue neutrality.”).
536. See discussion supra Part III.B.3.; see also States, CARBON TAX CENTER, http://
www.carbontax.org/states/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2016).
537. Carbon Tax Bill Introduced into Assembly, PR NEWSWIRE (Aug. 28, 2015, 2:51
PM), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/carbon-tax-bill-introduced-into-assembly300134771.html.
538. Craig Rubens, Bay Area’s Carbon Tax, the Nation’s First, Rankles Big Oil,
GIGAOM (May 22, 2008. 11:00 AM), https://gigaom.com/2008/05/22/bay-area-leads-withnations-first-carbon-tax/.
539. Kristin Eberhard, All the World’s Carbon Pricing Systems in One Animated
Map, SIGHTLINE INST. (Nov. 17, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.sightline.org/2014/11/17/
all-the-worlds-carbon-pricing-systems-in-one-animated-map/.
540. Kate Galbraith, Climate Change Concerns Push Chile to Forefront of Carbon Tax
Movement, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/30/business/
international/climate-change-concerns-push-chile-to-forefront-of-carbon-tax-movement.
html?_r=0; see also Sao Paulo, Chile Becomes the First South American Country to Tax
Carbon, REUTERS (Sept. 26, 2014, 1:00 AM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/carbon-chiletax-idUKL6N0RR4V720140927.
541. Eberhard, supra note 539; see also S ECRETARIA DE M EDIO AMBIENTE Y
RECURSOS NATURALES, CARBON TAX IN MEXICO 2 (May 2014), https://www.thepmr.org/
system/files/documents/Carbon%20Tax%20in%20Mexico.pdf.
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APPENDIX B
CHART 3: ESTIMATED EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS IN EASTERN
HEMISPHERE JURISDICTIONS WITH CARBON TAXES
RANK FOR
BEST CARBON
TAX
1

START
DATE

CHANGE IN CO2 EMISSIONS

Sweden542

1991

emissions decreased 19% since 2003

2

United Kingdom543

2001

3

Demark544

1992

emissions decreased by 13% since
2007
emissions decreased by 33% since
2006
emissions decreased 23% from 2007
to 2011
emissions were expected to be
reduced by 1.7 to 2.7 million
metric tons CO 2 annually in 2000.
In covered sectors, emissions were
expected to be reduced by
approximately 5%.
emissions increased by 32% from
1991 to 2014
emissions have dropped 15% since
2008
increased 17% since 2005

4

JURISDICTION

545

Finland

1990
546

5

Netherlands

1990

6

Norway547

1991

7

Ireland548

2010

8

Iceland549

2005

9

Switzerland

2008

10

France551

2005

emissions have decreased 5% since
2008
emissions decrease 13% since 2005

2012

emissions increase 16% since 1990

11

550

552

Japan

542. Rayne, supra note 106.
543. Id.
544. Id.
545. Id.
546. Sumner et al., supra note 103, at 9.
547. Rayne, supra note 106.
548. CARBON TAX CTR., supra note 536.
549. Rayne, supra note 106.
550. Id.
551. Id.
552. Mari Iwata, Japan CO2 Emissions Worst on Record, WALL S T. J. (Nov. 17,
2014, 5:50 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2014/11/17/japan-co2-emissions-worston-record/.

137

SHURTZ(ADA) (DO NOT DELETE)

9/29/2016 10:31 AM

CHART 4: ESTIMATED EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS IN WESTERN
HEMISPHERE JURISDICTIONS WITH CARBON TAXES
RANK FOR
BEST
CARBON TAX
1

JURISDICTION

START
DATE

CHANGE IN CO2 EMISSIONS

British Columbia553

2008

2

San Francisco, CA554

2008

3

Boulder, CO555

2007

4

Québec556

2007

6

Chile557

2018

7

Oregon558

2016

GHG emissions were expected to be
reduced emissions by up to 3 million
metric tons CO2 annually in 2020
due to the tax
by 2010, the program reduced
emissions by 12% below 1990 levels
emissions in 2007 and 2008
decreased from 2006 levels. Greatest
reductions due to programs funded
but the carbon tax: 1)Renewables
energy activities (60,000 metric tons
of CO2), 2)Transportation (33,000
metric tons CO2), and 3)Energy
efficiency (6,700 metric tons CO2)
emissions were expected to be
reduced by 11.2 million metric tons
CO2 by 2012 due to the carbon tax
predicts to reduce its emissions 20%
by 2020 below 2007 levels this
includes reduction by increase in
renewable energy
reduce emissions by 12-13% below
baseline projections

8

Mexico559

2012

emissions decreased 0.08% since
2008

9

Costa Rica560

1997

increased 17% from 2000 to 2005

553. Sumner et al., supra note 103, at 20.
554. THE GLOBAL COMPACT CITIES PROGRAMME, supra note 455.
555. Sumner et al., supra note 103, at 20.
556. Id.
557. Galbraith, supra note 540.
558. Liu & Renfro, supra note 140.
559. CO2 Emissions (Metric tons per Capita)-Mexico, WORLD BANK, http://data.
worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.PC/countries/MX-XJ-XT?display=graph.
560. Rayne, supra note 106.
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APPENDIX C

LIGHT AND
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OIL
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X
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X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

SWITZERLAND

X

X

SOUTH AFRICA

DIESEL

X

JAPAN

X

X

ICELAND

ELECTRICITY

IRELAND

X

FRANCE

COAL

UNITED KINGDOM

X

DENMARK

GASOLINE

SWEDEN

X

NORWAY

NATURAL
GAS

NETHERLANDS

FINLAND

JURISDICTION/
COUNTRY

CHART 5: MAJOR TAXED SECTIONS IN EXISTING AND PROPOSED
CARBON TAX SYSTEMS IN THE EASTERN HEMISPHERE

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

TYPE OF
CARBON
FUEL

X
X
X*

LIQUEFIED
PETROLEUM
GAS
HOME
HEATING OIL
SOLID FUEL

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

* Light only.
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MEXICO

COSTA RICA

CHILE

SAN FRANCISCO, CA

CALIFORNIA

BOULDER, CO

BRITISH COLUMBIA

QUÉBEC

JURISDICTION/
COUNTRY

CHART 6: MAJOR TAXED SECTIONS IN EXISTING AND PROPOSED
CARBON TAX SYSTEMS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

TYPE OF
CARBON
FUEL

140

NATURAL
GAS

X

X

GASOLINE

X

X

COAL

X

ELECTRICITY

X

DIESEL

X

LIGHT AND
HEAVY FUEL
OIL

X

LIQUEFIED
PETROLEUM
GAS

X

HOME
HEATING OIL

X

PERMITTED
FACILITIES

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

